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State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S u p r e m e C o u r t 
In Re: Request of His Excellency, Theodore Francis 
Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island 
and Providence Plantations, for an Opinion as to 
the Validity of Legislation for the Calling and 
Holding of a Constitutional Convention. 
BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
O F 
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
In this matter, which is before this Honorable Court for an 
opinion upon a question raised by His Excellency, the Gov-
ernor, as to whether or not it would be a valid exercise of 
the legislative power if the General Assembly should provide 
by law for a convention to be called to revise or amend the 
Constitution of this State, and on certain incidental ques-
tions concerning the organization and conduct thereof and 
submission to the people of the results, if any, of such con-
vention, the Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island 
and Providence Plantations respectfully submits the follow-
ing argument in support of the contention that it would be a 
valid exercise of the legislative power if the General Assem-
bly should provide by law for a convention to be called to 
revise, rather than amend, the Constitution of the State. 
A. The General Assembly can legally call a constitu-
tional convention to revise the Constitution of the State 
notwithstanding the fact that said Constitution by Article 
XIII thereof permits the General Assembly to propose 
amendments but omits to provide for the holding of a 
constitutional convention. 
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I The people have the right to make and alter their con-
stitutions of government. 
a. This principle is stated in Article I, Section 1, of our 
Constitution, as follows: 
« we declare that the basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and alter their con-
stitutions of g o v e r n m e n t ; . . . . " 
George Washington is quoted as being the author 
thereof. 
1. In said section, prior to this declaration we find this : 
"We do declare that the essential and unquestionable 
rights and principles hereinafter mentioned shall be 
established, maintained, and preserved, and shall be 
of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial, 
and executive proceedings." 
2. Said section further declares that the people have 
power to change their constitution : 
aa. In said section we find this: 
"but that the constitution which at any time ex-
ists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act 
of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon 
all." 
These were Washington's words, also. 
b. This principle is generally extant; 
1. Resolution of Rhode Island Convention of 1790 which 
ratified the Federal Constitution: 
"That the powers of government may be re-assumed 
by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary 
to their happiness." 
2. Declaration of Independence: 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men 
are created equal; that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among 
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; 
that to secure these rights governments are instituted 
among men, deriving their just powers from the con-
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sent of the governed; that whenever any form of gov-
ernment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to in-
sti tute a new government, laying its foundation on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such 
form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
safety and happiness." 
3. Virginia Constitution: 
"When any government shall be found inadequate or 
contrary to these purposes, a majority of the com-
munity hath an indubitable, inalienable and inde-
feasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such 
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the 
public w e a l ; . . . . " 
4. Massachusetts Constitution: 
"Whenever these great objects are not obtained, the 
people have a right to alter the government, and to 
take measures necessary for their safety, prosperity 
and happiness. The people alone have an incontest-
able, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute 
government; and to reform, alter or totally change 
the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity 
and happiness require it ." 
5. Pennsylvania Constitution: 
"Whenever these great ends of government are not 
obtained, the people have a right, by common con-
sent, to change it, and take such measures as to them 
may appear necessary to promote their safety and 
happiness . . . . The community hath an indubitable, 
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter 
or abolish government in such manner as shall be by 
tha t community judged most conducive to the public 
weal." 
6. Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Indiana 336: 
"To erect the state, to institute the form of its gov-
ernment, is a function inherent in the sovereign peo-
ple; to carry out its purpose of protecting and en-
forcing the rights and liberties of which the ordained 
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Constitution is a guaranty by enacting rules of civil 
conduct relating to the details and particulars of the 
government instituted, is the function of the Legis-
lature under the general grant of authority. It need-
ed no reservation in the organic law to preserve to 
the people their inherent power to change their gov-
ernment against such a grant of legislative author-
ity; and yet we find in the first section of the first 
article of the Constitution this statement of the pur-
pose of the government which they had builded, and 
the declaration of their power over i t : 'We declare 
that all men are created equal; that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that 
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness; that all power is inherent in the people; and 
that all free governments are, and of right ought to 
be, founded on their authority, and instituted for 
their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advance-
ment of these ends, the people have, a t all times, an 
indefeasible right to alter and reform their govern-
ment'." 
c. Government in America is based upon popular sover-
eignty; and said principle is given effect through 
representative government. 
1. Constitution of the United States: 
"We, the people of the United States . . . . do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America." 
2. Constitution of Rhode Is land: 
"We, the people of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations . . . . do ordain and establish 
this constitution of government." 
3. Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, P. 1: 
"Of the American system of government, the two 
leading principles are, first, that laws and Constitu-
tions can be rightfully formed and established only 
by the people over whom they are to be put in force; 
and, secondly, that the people being a corporate unit, 
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comprising all the citizens of the State, and, there-
fore, too unwieldy to do this important work directly, 
agents or representatives must be employed to do it, 
and that, in such numbers, so selected, and charged 
respectively with such functions, as to make it rea-
sonably certain that the will of the people will be 
not only adequately but speedily executed." 
d. This right is in some cases legal; in others revolu-
tionary. 
1. Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, P. 236: 
"The second class of documents consists of Bills of 
Rights of a large number of our Constitutions, con-
taining broad general assertions of the right of a 
people to alter or abolish their form of government, 
at any time, and in such manner as they may deem 
expedient. The peculiarity of these documents is, 
that they seem to assert the right in question as a 
legal r ight ; a t least, they furnish a plausible argu-
ment for those who are willing to have it believed 
that the right is a legal one; when, in fact, it is a 
revolutionary right. The framers of those Constitu-
tions generally inserted in them provisions for their 
own amendment. Had nothing fur ther been said, it 
might have been inferred, that no other mode of se-
curing needed changes was under any circumstances 
to be pursued, but they prescribed in those instru-
ments. Such, however, was not the intention of their 
framers. They meant to leave to the people, besides, 
the great right of revolution, formally and solemnly 
asserted in the Declaration of Independence. They, 
therefore, affirmed it to be a right of the people to 
alter or abolish their Constitutions, in any manner 
whatever; that is, first, legally, in the mode pointed 
out in their Constitutions, or BY THE CUSTOMARY LAW 
OF THE LAND; and, secondly, illegally, that is, for suf-
ficient causes, by revolutionary force." 
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II. Revision or alteration of the Constitution brought about 
by the will of the people assembled under such legisla-
tive provisions as may be necessary to ascertain that 
will truly and authentically is valid, and legal as having 
been brought about "BY THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF 
THE LAND." 
a. There is "one uniform current of law, of precedent, 
and of practice" to this effect. 
1. Daniel Webster: 
"We see, therefore, from the commencement of the 
government under which we live down to this late act 
of the State of New York, one uniform current of 
law, of precedent, and of practice, all going to estab-
lish the point that changes in government are to be 
brought about by the will of the people assembled 
under such legislative provisions as may be neces-
sary to ascertain that will, fully and authentically." 
NOTE: The Act of the State of New York thus quoted by 
Mr. Webster, and which he had dwelt upon in detail as an 
illustration of American Constitutional law, was an act of 
legislation providing for a constitutional convention under 
an existing constitution, containing a provision for amend-
ment through a majority vote of one Legislature, followed 
by publication and a two-thirds vote of the next Legislature, 
and a majority vote of the people. I t contained no provision 
for calling a convention, and no declaration of rights upon 
the subject. 
Webster thus describes the ac t : 
"One of the most recent laws for taking the will of the 
people, in any state, is the law of 1845, of the State of 
New York. I t begins by recommending to the people to 
assemble in their several election districts, and proceed 
to vote for delegates to a convention. If you will take 
pains to read that act, it will be seen that New York 
regarded it as an ordinary exercise of legislative power. 
I t applies all the penalties for fraudulent voting, as in 
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other elections. I t punishes false oaths as in other cases, 
certificates of the proper officers were to be held conclu-
sive, and the will of the people was, in this respect, col-
lected essentially in the same manner, supervised by the 
same officers, under the same guards, against false and 
fraudulent collusion and misrepresentation, as are used 
in voting for state or United States Officers." 
2. Act of 1824 of Rhode Island General Assembly: 
At the January 1824 session of the General Assembly 
there was passed an act entitled: "An Act to author-
ize the holding of a Convention for the purpose of 
forming a written Constitution of Government for 
this State." I t was therein provided that the freemen 
of the several towns within this State, qualified to 
vote for general officers therein, be requested, a t the 
annual town meetings in the following April, to 
choose delegates to attend a convention for the pur-
pose of f raming a written constitution of government 
for this State; that the delegates thus chosen should 
meet a t Newport on June 21st; that af ter said con-
vention should have framed such a constitution of 
government as they should think proper, the same 
should be submitted to the freemen for their ratifica-
tion in town meeting, to be called or holden at such 
time as should be directed by said convention; and 
that, if such constitution should be ratified as pro-
vided in said act, it should go into effect. 
3. At the June 1834 session of the General Assembly 
there was passed an act entit led: "An Act to provide 
for holding a convention for the purposes therein 
mentioned," and it provided that a convention should 
be holden at Providence, on the first Monday of the 
following September, "for the purpose of amending 
the present or proposing a new constitution for this 
State" and the freemen were requested to choose del-
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egates thereto at the semi-annual town or ward meet-
ings in August. 
4. At the January 1841 session of the General Assembly 
a joint resolution to the same effect was passed call-
ing a Constitutional Convention to meet a t Provi-
dence in November, 1841. 
5. To the same effect was an act passed at the June 1842 
session of the General Assembly calling a convention 
to meet at Newport in September. 
6. At the May session, 1853, the General Assembly 
passed an act entitled: "An Act recommending a 
Convention of the people of the State, to form a Con-
stitution for the State," which commences as fol-
lows : 
"Section 1. The people of this State are hereby in-
vited and requested to give in their ballots at their 
town or ward meetings, to be holden on Tuesday, the 
28th day of June next, in relation to the Convention 
hereinafter provided for, on such ballots shall be 
printed or written, or partly printed or written, by 
those voters who are in favor of the proposed conven-
tion, the word 'Convention', and by those voters who 
are opposed thereto, the words 'No Convention';" and 
said act fur ther provided that if a majority of votes 
should be cast in favor of a convention i t would be 
taken to be the will of the people that a convention 
should meet, and that the Governor should by proc-
lamation convene the delegates elected "as herein-
after provided," to meet in Convention for the pur-
pose of forming a constitution of government for the 
State; and that the people were invited and request-
ed, "at the time and place aforesaid", to elect dele-
gates to meet in convention on the 9th day of August 
for the purpose of forming a constitution." 
7. At the October Session 1853, the General Assembly 
passed an Act entitled: "An Act recommending a 
Convention of the people of the State to revise the 
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Constitution of the State," whereby the people were 
invited and requested to vote, on November 21st, on 
the question whether the delegates, elected on June 
28, 1853, under the terms of the Act passed at the 
May Session, recommending a convention, should 
"convene for the purpose of considering the expedi-
ency of framing a Constitution of government for 
this State, differing from the present Constitution in 
these specific and only particulars, to wi t : "and that, 
if a majority should vote in the affirmative, a conven-
tion should be convened." 
8. Massachusetts—1853: 
(aa) The following question was submitted to the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts for an opin-
ion : "Can any specific and particular amend-
ment or amendments to the Constitution be 
made in any other manner than that prescribed 
in the Ninth Article of the Amendments adopt-
ed in 1820?" 
To this question the judges replied, that— 
"Considering that, previous to 1820, no mode 
was provided by the Constitution for i ts own 
amendment, that no other power for that pur-
pose than in the mode alluded to is anywhere 
given in the Constitution, by implication or 
otherwise, and that the mode thereby provided 
appears manifestly to have been carefully con-
sidered, and the power of altering the Constitu-
tion thereby conferred to have been cautiously 
restrained and guarded, we think a strong im-
plication arises against the existence of any 
other power, under the constitution, for the 
same purposes." 
(i) In Section 574, Jameson, the author, says 
as to th is : 
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"To this question the answer ought to 
have been in the negative, since it inquired 
as to the lawfulness of doing the same 
thing in a different way from that pre-
scribed by the Constitution." 
(bb) The constitutional convention was held not-
withstanding the opinion. 
(i) In that Convention, Marcus Morton, who 
was one of the judges who gave the opinion 
and who was twice Governor of the State, 
said: 
"Whether we sit legally or illegally, whether 
by right or usurpation, if the people choose 
to adopt what we submit to them, it then 
becomes authority." 
(ii) Joel Parker, a former Chief Justice of New 
Hampshire and a delegate to the conven-
tion, said: 
" I t is well known that the argument has 
been advanced that this convention was rev-
olutionary in its character because the con-
stitution provided no such mode in which a 
convention could legally assemble; that 
there was one mode provided by the consti-
tution for the revision of that instrument, 
and any other mode is in its nature revolu-
tionary. For myself, personally, I do not 
entertain that opinion. I believe this con-
vention to have been lawfully assembled, 
and that it is bound to proceed according to 
law." 
9. Constitutions have been adopted through the action 
of conventions assembled pursuant to a law of the 
existing legislature in almost all the cases, if not in 
all in which constitutions have been created or re-
newed. And this, whether the constitution contained 
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a special provision for calling a convention or not, 
and also whether it contained a provision for legisla-
tive amendment or not, and whether the latter stood 
alone in the constitution or with a provision for a 
convention. 
(aa) Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State 
Constitutions, P. 44: 
" I t has now become the established rule that 
where the constitution contains no provision 
for the calling of a convention, but has no pro-
vision expressly confining amendment to a par-
ticular method, the legislature may provide by 
law for the calling of a convention—that is, the 
enactment of such a law is within the power of 
the legislature unless expressly forbidden, and 
is considered a regular exercise of legislative 
power." 
(bb) Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, P. 
210: 
"The second subdivision consisting of Conven-
tions called for legitimate constitutional pur-
poses by the respective State legislatures, under 
their general legislative power, without the spe-
cial authorization of their Constitutions, com-
prises twenty-seven Conventions." 
(cc) Other such conventions have been held in Mis-
souri (1890), Louisiana (1898), Connecticut 
(1902), Massachusetts (1917). 
(dd) Roger Sherman Hoar, Constitutional Conven-
tions, P. 41: 
"There are now twelve states which have no ex-
press constitutional provisions for the calling 
of conventions, yet in eight of these: Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jer-
sey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Massachusetts, 
conventions have been held without any serious 
question being made as to their legality." 
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"In Vermont the special commission appointed 
in 1908 . . . suggested the possibility of holding 
a convention." 
"The Supreme Court of Indiana has asserted 
the legality of this Convention." 
10. Reconstruction Conventions. 
Charles S. Bradley, "The Method of Changing the 
Constitution of the States, etc."—P. 25: 
"When changes became necessary in the constitu-
tions of the states which attempted to secede, Con-
gress provided that the ante-bellum constitutions 
should be changed through the medium of conven-
tions, and not according to the method provided in 
them for amendment through the Legislature." 
"The States of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louis-
iana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas had in 
their constitutions preceding the war the same 
provisions for amendment that we have in Rhode 
Island, without any provisions for a convention. 
And the proper method of change under them was 
deemed in Congress and in those States, to be by 
Convention, and not by legislative amendment." 
b. This contention accords with principle. 
1. Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, Sec. 219: 
"Whenever a Constitution needs a general revision, 
a Convention is indispensably necessary; and if there 
is contained in the Constitution no provision for such 
a body, the calling of one is believed to be directly 
within the scope of the ordinary legislative power." 
"Were it not a proper exercise of legislative power, 
the usurpation has been so often committed with the 
general acquiescence, that it is now too late to ques-
tion it as such. I t must be laid down as among the 
established prerogatives of our general assemblies, 
that, the Constitution being silent, whenever they 
deem it expedient they may call conventions to revise 
the fundamental law." 
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2. Jameson, Sec. 394: 
"The assertion that where express authority to call a 
Convention has not been given by the Constitution, a 
legislature has no power to do it, I deem to be un-
founded, for two reasons: first, as contravening 
sound political principle; and secondly, as falsified 
by well-established usage under the American 
system." 
"under the general grant of legislative power found 
in our State Constitutions, a legislature is competent 
to provide by law for all exigencies requiring provi-
sions of a legislative nature, so fa r as i t is not re-
strained by rules of morality, or by express constitu-
tional inhibitions. This is believed to cover the whole 
case." 
"Nor is it t rue . . . . that the giving to the legislature 
in a Constitution express power to recommend spe-
cific amendments to that instrument, involves by im-
plication, the denial to that body of power to call 
conventions for a general revision of it." 
"Such a grant is applicable only to disconnected and 
unimportant amendments. I t is obvious that a grant 
of power to propose such amendments in a summary 
manner, and without the formalities ordinarily at-
tending the enactment of fundamental laws, cannot 
be considered as an implied prohibition to effect a 
general revision of a Constitution in the only appro-
priate and practicable "way, by a Convention. If it be 
not in the power of a legislature to call a Convention, 
tha t fact is not to be inferred from a positive author-
ity to effect a different object in a different way. The 
idea advanced by the Court is based on the legal 
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—a max-
im doubtless of wide application in the construction 
of ordinary statutes, and of contracts between man 
and man, but whose applicability to the construction 
of fundamental laws has been denied or doubted by 
high authority." 
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"I t is too late to deny the right of a legislature, in 
the absence of express constitutional authority, to 
call a Convention, . . . Though doubtless considered 
irregular in its earlier stages, the usage has become 
established for legislatures to take the initiative in 
such cases, as of course; and since the year 1820, 
when the New York Council of Revision vetoed a 
Convention Bill because the legislature had passed it 
without providing for a submission of it to the peo-
ple, not as being beyond its power, but as inexpedient, 
the power ha# very frequently been exercised 
III. If the General Assembly, by a legislative act, exercises 
its legal right to call a convention, the convention may 
legally assemble. 
a. It has this power granted to it by our Constitution: 
1. Article IV, Section 10: 
"The General Assembly shall continue to exercise 
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless 
prohibited in this constitution." 
Chief Justice Bradley said: (p. 28) 
"That the power to pass an act providing for a 
convention of the people of a State to reconstruct 
their State constitution exists in the Legislature 
of a State, unless it has been prohibited, no one 
will dispute. It need not be specifically granted. 
I t exists by force of this creation, or in grant to 
one branch of the government of general legisla-
tive power." 
Also, (p. 31) 
"Under the charter government, the general assem-
bly possessed all powers. Many of the people of the 
state preferred this patriarchal government to the 
division of powers systematically arranged in the 
usual State constitution. . . . While granting a con-
stitution, they yet incorporate in i t the provision 
that the General Assembly shall continue to exer-
cise the powers they have hitherto exercised unless 
prohibited by the constitution. Among those powers 
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was that of calling a Constitutional Convention. 
Had they meant to have excluded that power, they 
would have said so." 
2. Article I, Section 23: 
"The enumeration of the foregoing rights shall not 
be construed to impair or deny others retained by 
the people." 
3. Dodd, p. 46: 
"The calling of conventions by legislative action 
alone, without requiring the submission of the ques-
tion to a vote of the people, has been the method 
adopted by a few states, . . . Then, too, when no pro-
vision is contained in a state constitution regarding 
the calling of a convention, it would seem to be 
within the discretion of the legislature as to wheth-
er the question should be submitted to the people" 
Examples: Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jer-
sey, Missouri, Arkansas, North Carolina, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, and Reconstruction Conventions. 
4. Jameson, p. 111: 
"There may, then, be two cases: first, where the 
legislature itself passes upon the question of calling 
a Convention, without the intervention of the elec-
toral body; and, secondly, where the legislature first 
recommends a call, then refers the question to a 
vote of the electors, and, finally, on an affirmative 
vote by the latter issues the call." 
5. Jameson, Section 121: 
"The legislature is the fittest body to act upon the 
question of calling a Convention, because of all 
questions that is most dependent, for a proper deci-
sion, on a wise balancing of expediencies. . . . In this 
respect, the legislature is, of all public bodies, that 
which is best adapted to this particular work. I t is 
i ts prime function to determine the expedient. Be-
sides, of all representative bodies, excepting only the 
electors, it is, under all forms of government, the 
most numerous." 
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6. Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59: 
"Mr. Webster stated in 1848, in his argument before 
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case 
of Luther vs. Borden, ' that of the old thirteen 
states, their Constitution with but one exception 
contained no provision for their own amendment, 
yet there is hardly one that has not altered its Con-
stitution, and it has been done by conventions called 
by the legislature, as an ordinary exercise of pow-
er'." 
"If this is t r u e . . . it would seem as though the ques-
tion as to whether the calling of a constitutional 
convention was a legal exercise of power by the leg-
islature, should now be considered by all judicial 
tribunals as settled so firmly as a part of the com-
mon law of our governments, that any attempt to 
disturb it at this day would savor more of revolu-
tion than legitimacy." 
7. Our Constitution contains no express prohibition 
in relation to the calling of a constitutional conven-
tion. 
8. No such prohibition can be implied, 
(aa) Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59: 
"The conclusion I have drawn from all this is, 
that there is underlying our whole system of 
American government a principle of acknowl-
edged right in the people to change their Con-
stitutions, except where especially prohibited 
in a Constitution itself, in all cases and at all 
times, whether there is a way provided in 
their Constitutions or not, by the interposi-
tion of the legislature, and the calling of a 
convention as was done in the case at hand." 
(bb) Charles S. Bradley, p. 26: 
"This rule (expressio unius est exclusio alteri-
us) does not apply to provisions in a statute, 
so as to take away any right of the sovereign 
power." 
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" 'The rights of the crown can never be taken away 
by doubtful words or ambiguous expressions, but 
only by express terms.'—Dwarris on Statutes, 706. 
"The good sense of this qualification is manifest. 
Any legislation which is to affect the sovereign pow-
er should not leave the right to mere inference. I t 
should be direct, especially in constitutions ad-
dressed to the popular mind and adopted by i t ; a 
great sovereign right should not be left to legal con-
jecture and implication. The people, in such pro-
ceedings, say what they mean. They do not leave a 
negation of one power to be inferred from the grant 
of another. The rule does not apply, again, in a 
statute so as to take away a right previously exist-
ing under the common law, or by custom, or by a 
preceding statute. I t applies only to statutes by 
which all the rights claimed under it are granted 
by it. 
'Affirmative words do not take away the common 
law, a former custom, or a preceding statute'."— 
Dwarris, 712. 
"The right here in question exists by the common 
law of the constitutions of American states, as we 
have seen by the former customs of this and other 
states." 
"Mr. Webster says: 'Every State is an independ-
ent, sovereign, political community except in so 
fa r as certain powers, which it might otherwise 
have exercised, have been conferred on a general 
government, established under a written consti-
tution, and exercising its authority over the peo-
ple of all the States. This general government is 
a limited government. I t s powers are specific and 
enumerated. All powers not conferred on it still 
remain with the States or with the people. The 
State Legislatures, on the other hand, possess all 
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usual and ordinary powers of government, subject 
to any limitations which may be imposed by their 
own constitutions, and with the exception, as I 
have said, of the operation on those powers of the 
constitution of the United States.' " 
"That the power to pass an act providing for a con-
vention of the people of a State to reconstruct their 
State constitution exists in the Legislature of a 
State, unless it has been prohibited, no one will dis-
pute. I t need not be specifically granted. I t exists 
by force of this creation, or in grant to one branch 
of the government of general legislative power. The 
Legislature of our State has that power, unless pro-
hibited, as a part of its prerogative and r ight ; not 
ex-necessitate, as the opinion says. There is, there-
fore, no room for any implied prohibition, for there 
is an express grant of the power in question by a 
general grant of legislative powers, which include 
it." 
"The rule does not apply, for the fur ther reason, 
that the power granted and power in question are 
different. We have seen, historically, that the pow-
er to reconstruct a constitution and the power to 
amend are different. As they are in common un-
derstanding, the power to repair a house is different 
from the power to tear down and rebuild it. The 
power in a legislature to amend an act of legislation 
does not exclude the power to repeal the act and 
make a new one. So the power in a government to 
amend its constitution, as occasion may require, 
does not exclude the power to reconstruct it anew, 
as occasion may require. The meaning of language is 
determined by usage. The usage of the provisions 
and terms by the people of this country is certainly 
uniform and fixed. The suggestion that we use them 
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in a different sense in Rhode Island has no percepti-
ble foundation. Indeed, it is hardly affirmed in the 
report or opinion." 
(cc) Jameson—P. 605: 
"Because the people could not do the same 
thing in a different way, it does not follow that 
they could not do a different thing in a differ-
ent way." 
(dd) Jameson—P. 606: 
"In the Massachusetts Convention of 1853, up-
on the question of the constitutionality of that 
body, the Hon. Joel Parker, formerly chief jus-
tice of New Hampshire, then a professor at 
the Cambridge Law School, said:— 
'I believe this Convention to have been law-
fully assembled . . . . Is not this mode of 
amending the Constitution, which is pre-
scribed in the Constitution in express terms, 
perfectly consistent with the other mode, by 
a Convention of delegates? There is no an-
tagonism between the two modes. The peo-
ple say by their Constitution, "We will have 
a convenient mode by which this instrument 
can be amended without a Convention; and 
we will therefore embody a provision that 
the opinion of two successive legislatures 
that the Constitution ought to be amended, 
shall be submitted to us for our action with-
out the expense of a Convention." This is 
all very well; but does i t exclude the idea 
that a Convention may be holden where 
there is nothing antagonistic between the 
two modes? By no means.' 
"Still more explicitly, in the same debate, he 
said: ' I do not understand that there is any-
thing in the terms of this provision of the Con-
stitution which makes it exclusive, . . . . which 
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makes it the sole and the only mode in which 
the provisions of the Constitution are to be 
amended. I do not understand the principle 
to be that the mention of one mode excludes 
all the other modes which would have existed 
but for the mention of that mode. What is the 
principle upon this subject? I admit the prin-
ciple in common law that the designation of 
one person or one thing in some instances is 
exclusion of all others; but does that principle 
apply to this case? That principle applies to 
all cases where, from the necessity or the na-
ture of the case, it is shown to be the intent 
that other things should be excluded.' 
"In 1874 Mr. Charles O'Conor, the eminent 
lawyer, at the instance of the New York Tri-
bune, rendered an opinion touching the valid-
ity of certain amendments submitted to the 
people of New York, in respect to which the 
regularity of the legislative action had been 
denied. In the course of his opinion, af ter 
stating that concurrent resolutions of the leg-
islative bodies in two different years, and a 
final approval by the people, constituted the 
process prescribed by the Constitution, Mr. 
O'Conor said:— 
'This instrument does not prohibit the em-
ployment of different means unless such a 
negative can be implied from its having thus 
made provision for a method which is unde-
niably convenient and suitable. I think it 
is not maintainable by any fa i r reasoning 
that a State Constitution which so provides 
for its own amendment cannot be al-
tered or varied from in any other manner. 
Certainly such a negative implication is not 
admissible in New York, for its present 
State government came into being on pre-
cisely an opposite bas is ; ' that is, was framed 
by a Convention, for which no provision had 
been made in the Constitution of 1821." 
CONCLUSION 
I t is submitted, therefore, that it would be a valid exercise 
of the legislative power if the General Assembly should enact 
legislation of the kind outlined in the request of His Excel-
lency, the Governor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J O H N P . HARTIGAN, 
Attorney General. 
J O H N J . COONEY, 
Second Assistant 
Attorney General. 
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FOREWORD 
At the instance of the President of the Rhode Island Bar 
Association, the undersigned agreed to undertake the 
presentation of their views with reference to the Constitu-
tional validity of a Convention properly summoned for the 
purpose of revising or amending the Constitution of the 
State of Rhode Island with a view to submitting the result 
of the Convention's work to the people of the State of Rhode 
Island for their approval or disapproval. 
The undersigned have, at the suggestion of the President 
of the Bar Association, taken what might be called, in the 
light of the questions propounded by His Excellency, the 
affirmative side; that is, briefly stated, that the Legislature 
as the agents and representatives of the sovereign power, 
the people, may call a Constitutional Convention, so-called, 
without infringing upon or acting in contravention of the 
provisions of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island 
of 1842 or of the Constitution of the United States, i t being 
conclusively presumed herein that a Constitutional Con-
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vention, so-called, would not submit to the people for their 
approval or rejection an instrument or pact inconsistent 
with the provisions of Article IV, Sec. 4 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 
In so doing, the undersigned earnestly hope that the con-
tents of this memorandum, supplemented by oral argument, 
will throw some light upon a momentous question, from the 
standpoint of the people of the State of Rhode Island, and 
prove of some assistance to the Honorable Court in the de-
termination of the questions submitted. 
Outline of Argument 
In the presentation of the question, we urge the following 
propositions: 
I. 
The Constitution of the State of Rhode Island may be 
revised and altered by the people of this State in the exer-
cise of their sovereign rights and privileges through the 
medium of a Constitutional Convention. 
II. 
The General Assembly may by appropriate legislation 
provide for the holding of a Constitutional Convention 
and for the election at the instance of the Governor of 
delegates to this Convention. 
III. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in "Opinion of the 
Justices," 14 R. I. 649, affords no effectual bar to the 
calling and holding of a Constitutional Convention for the 
purpose of revising the existing Constitution and the sub-
mission of the Constitution so revised to the people for 
their approval or disapproval. 
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The Constitution of the State of Rhode Island may be 
revised and altered by the people of this State in the exer-
cise of their sovereign rights and privileges through the 
medium of a Constitutional Convention. 
Under a Republican form of government, the powers and 
attr ibutes of sovereignty are vested in the people. With 
this fundamental principle, there can be no complaint and, 
with the advocate urging it, there can be no controversy. 
See Webster's Reply to Calhoun, and page 18 of Pamphlet 
entitled "Changing the Constitutions of the states, Espe-
cially Rhode Island " Perhaps the most outstanding recog-
nition of this political axiom is found in the words familiar 
to all embodied in the preamble of the Federal Constitution, 
"We, the people of the United States," etc. 
The well established powers and privileges that inhere in 
the concept of sovereignty are usually described and re-
garded as inalienable and indefeasible; so commonplace 
are these adjectives in describing these powers and privileges 
that a repetition of the statement seems trite and a citation 
of sources and authorities with reference to the applicability 
of these descriptive terms quite unnecessary. 
They constitute, however, elemental as these remarks may 
be, the premise, so important to the contention herein made, 
that leads indisputably to the conclusion that the People of 
this state may, at any time they so desire, revise the present 
Constitution and adopt through orderly proceedings a new 
Constitution to replace the existing one under which its 
Government now functions. 
The thought is well expressed in the following state-
ment : 
"Under our system of government, it is apparently 
well settled that the ultimate sovereignty is in the 
people # # The power to change the funda-
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mental law—the written Constitution—is in them alone. 
I t is this principle which causes the Courts to recognize 
generally the right of the Legislature as the organ of 
the people to submit a call for a Convention of the 
people and to regard such a Convention as a valid 
method of Constitution making, although the existing 
Constitution contains no provision to that effect." 
The Powers of Constitutional Conventions, see note, 
29 Harvard Law Review, 528, 529. 
The people themselves collectively and as a sovereign body 
could undoubtedly, through orderly proceedings of their 
own making, at any time adopt a Constitution to super-
sede the existing instrument. This method has never been 
effectually used by the people although theoretically a re-
vision could be accomplished in this manner. The obvious 
demerit in such a method is the fact that such a body would 
necessarily be unwieldy and not susceptible to orderly pro-
cedure. Consequently, Constitutions of the various states 
of the Union have, from the earliest days of our political 
history, been revised or amended through the only efficient 
device that affords the most practical machinery for ac-
complishing the result, namely, the Constitutional Con-
vention. 
One of the greatest Constitutional lawyers in the history 
of this country in his argument in Luther vs. Borden, 
7 How. 1—a decision most apt in that it revolves about the 
tumultuous times in which the present Constitution was 
adopted—affirmed this fundamental principle in the course 
of his presentation when he said: 
"That of the old thirteen states, their Constitutions, 
with but one exception, contained no provision for their 
own amendment, yet there is hardly one that has not 
altered its Constitution, and it has been done by Con-
ventions called by the Legislature, as an ordinary exer-
cise of power." 
105 
The quoted language is taken from Wood's Appeal, 
75 Pa. 59, infra. 
From the dawn of our political history, the people have 
exercised this sovereign privilege. Witness, for example, 
the abrogation by the Constitutional Convention method of 
the Articles of Confederation, despite the fact that it was 
originally contemplated that the covenant which resulted 
in the formation of the first union of the thirteen original 
states was to continue in perpetuity as evinced by the fol-
lowing excerpt from the Articles: 
"And the Articles of this Confederation shall be in-
violably observed by every state and the Union shall be 
perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time here-
af ter be made in any of them unless such alteration be 
agreed to by a Congress of the United States and be 
af terwards confirmed by the Legislature of every state." 
Since that early day, Constitutional Conventions have 
become the commonplace method of either revising in toto 
or amending in par t the Constitutions of the various State 
Governments. 
Is there anything particularly unique that distinguishes 
the present Rhode Island Constitution from the Constitu-
tions of the many states that have been revised and altered 
through the media of Constitutional Conventions? Is the 
form of government set up in 1842 so essentially and vitally 
different from the others that this Constitution cannot be 
revised as distinguished from amended by popular action 
and with popular approval in any manner that the people 
themselves desire so long as the result of their efforts and 
the expression of their desires is not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Federal Constitution? Can it be that 
the framers of the State Constitution have fettered the 
people for all time, insofar as complete revision of the 
Constitution is concerned? I t would seem, if precedent and 
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analogy are of any significance in the determination of the 
question, that those who urge that the Constitution of this 
State cannot be revised or superseded by a new instrument, 
but can be changed only by amendment through the ma-
chinery set forth in Article XI I I of the Constitution, have 
taken a decidedly insecure position. 
I t is true, of course, that, like most of the early Constitu-
tions, there is in the Rhode Island Constitution no provision 
specifically covering the matter of a Constitutional Con-
vention. The Pennsylvania Court, in one of the leading 
cases on this subject, certainly one of the decisions most 
frequently cited, after setting forth Mr. Webster's views, 
supra, states, with reference to the accuracy and intrinsic 
truth of the great statesman's observation: 
"If this is true, and my own examination, so far as 
with the limited time and opportunity since the argu-
ment of this case, I have been able to make it, has veri-
fied it, as well as shown the continuation of the same 
practice to the present day, i t would seem as though 
the question as to whether the calling of a Constitu-
tional Convention was a legal exercise of power by the 
Legislature, should now be considered by all judicial 
tribunals as settled so firmly as a part of the common 
law of our Governments, that any attempt to disturb 
it at this day would savor more of revolution than 
legitimacy. He would be bold, indeed, who would now 
assert that all these Conventions were usurpations, and 
that all the Constitutions proposed by them and adopted 
by the people were revolutionary." 
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 65; the quoted language is 
from the lower court decision, affirmed on appeal in an 
enlightening and very readable opinion of the Supreme 
Court. 
In Mr. Webster's statement, reference is made to the fact 
that but one or possibly two of the original states had Con-
stitutions containing provisions for their own amendment; 
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i t might be urged that of necessity, therefore, the Constitu-
tional Convention afforded at that time the only machinery 
for effecting a change. However, Jameson tells us as early 
as 1887 that on twenty-three different occasions Constitu-
tional Conventions had been held in states whose Constitu-
tions provided specifically for the legislative method of 
amendment. He fur ther states that at least six of these 
Conventions were the subject of judicial scrutiny and the 
action of each Convention was sustained by the Court before 
which the question of its validity was argued; in the re-
maining instances the validity or legality of the Convention 
method was never questioned. 
See Hoar on Constitutional Conventions, page 39, for a 
list of the twenty-three Conventions to which the author 
by a reference to Dodd, on "Revision of Constitutions" adds 
three more. 
According to Hoar, in five of the cited cases, the relevant 
Constitutions not only provided a method of amendment but 
expressly stated that the lat ter method was to be the ex-
clusive means of modifying or amending the instrument. 
In this connection he mentions (p. 49) Delaware, Georgia 
(on two occasions), Maryland and the United States. 
Here it might be added parenthetically that Article X I I I 
of the Rhode Island Constitution is patterned af ter a like 
provision in the Michigan Constitution which was used by 
many of the states as a precedent in connection with the 
draft ing of the provisions of the various Constitutions gov-
erning the matter of their amendment (Jameson, Sec. 395). 
At least it will be observed that there is a marked similarity 
between the provisions of the various Constitutions adopted 
or amended subsequent to the effective date of the Michigan 
Constitution of 1835, insofar, certainly, as the provision is 
concerned governing amendments to the various Constitu-
tions themselves. Yet the presence of such a provision 
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(similar to Article X I I I ) seems to have afforded no obstacle 
to the holding of Constitutional Conventions in several of 
these states. 
According to Mr. Hoar, on at least six occasions, Delaware 
in 1851, Georgia in 1788, Indiana in 1850, Massachusetts 
in 1820, Pennsylvania in 1789 and Nebraska in 1919, Con-
stitutional Conventions have been called when and as the 
people pleased in disregard of express Constitutional pro-
visions for a different method of calling the Convention. 
This statement appears in a signed but unpublished opinion 
of the author written about ten years ago; the historical 
data has not been verified but its accuracy has been accepted 
because of the standing and reputation of the author. 
I t would seem, therefore, from the standpoint of prin-
ciple and precedent, that the people may resort to the 
orderly procedure of a Constitutional Convention for the 
purpose of revising an existing Constitution. The Supreme 
Court of North Dakota has said that 
"the decided weight of authority and the more numerous 
precedents are arrayed on the side of the doctrine which 
supports the existence of this inherent Legislative power 
to call a Constitutional Convention, notwithstanding the 
fact that the instrument itself points out how it may be 
amended." 
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, 87; 68 N. W. 418, 34 
L. R. A. 97. 
See also Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533; 116 N. E-
920, 922. 
So long as the Constitution itself does not explicitly pro-
hibit the holding of a Constitutional Convention, it would 
seem now to be settled beyond peradventure that the revi-
sion of a Constitution by this method constitutes the estab-
lished rule. Dodd, "The Revision and Amendment of State 
Constitutions " page 44. 
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There is a serious question as a matter of sound theory 
as distinguished from what might actually have been done 
in practice, whether the people could not revise their Con-
stitution through the machinery of a Constitutional Con-
vention even though the instrument itself prohibited its 
revision in this manner. 
And this lat ter remark prompts the question, what legal, 
constitutional, and substantial objection can be made in the 
light of the explicit provisions of the Rhode Island Consti-
tution to the holding of a Constitutional Convention called 
for the express purpose of revising the present instrument? 
The opening section of the Constitution contains a quota-
tion from Washington's Farewell Address setting forth the 
fundamental principle that "the basis of our political sys-
tems is the right of the people to make and alter their Con-
stitutions of Government," etc. This statement embodies in 
it an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the people and, 
as a necessary corollary, an acknowledgment of their right 
to make and modify their Constitutions. I t is certainly of 
interest in connection with the construction of the state-
ment that i t was made toward the close of his second term 
and a t a time when Constitutional Conventions were the 
standard mode, if not the only medium, of effecting changes 
in State and Federal Constitutions. I t is certainly logical 
to presume that he had in mind, when he used the word 
"alter", the Constitutional Convention method. Under 
these circumstances, the word "alter" should be construed 
as though it connoted "revise" as distinguished from the 
verb "amend" which is used exclusively in the form of a 
noun, in Article X I I I of the Constitution with reference 
to the subject of amendments. 
Theoretically, those adopting the view that is opposed to 
our own contention must urge—aside from the Opinion of 
the Justices in 14 R. I., 649—that the people of the State 
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of Rhode Island in 1842 surrendered or dedicated ir-
revocably to the State their inherent right to revise their 
form of government. I t is impossible to believe that such a 
dedication was made by implication, that a complete relin-
quishment of a sovereign right that at the time was described 
as inalienable was left to intendment. 
In McCulloch vs. Maryland, Chief Justice MARSHALL, it 
strikes us, answered such a contention when he said: 
" I t has been said that the people had already sur-
rendered all their powers to the State sovereignties and 
had nothing more to give. But surely, the question 
whether they may resume and modify the powers 
granted to government does not remain to be settled 
in this country." 
McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404. 
This fundamental view is very well expressed by Mr. 
Justice WILSON, one of the framers of the Federal Consti-
tution and also a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, where he says in his Work: 
"Permit me to mention one great principle—the vital 
principle I may well call it—which diffuses animation 
and vigor through all the others. The principle I mean 
is this: That the supreme or sovereign power of the 
society resides in the citizens a t large; and that, there-
fore, they always retain the right of abolishing, alter-
ing or amending their Constitution, a t whatever time 
and in whatever manner they shall deem expedient." 
See quotation in Burke's Report, page 930, the quotation 
from Mr. Justice Wilson's Work being taken from Wilson, 
1 Works, page 17 (1790). 
I t is idle to urge as a basis for denying the right of the 
people of this state to hold a Constitutional Convention that 
desired changes to the Constitution may be effected through 
the medium of Article XI I I . Article X I I I contemplates the 
passage only of "amendments" to the Constitution. Chief 
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Justice Durfee contended that an entirely new Constitution 
might be adopted under the machinery provided by Article 
X I I I of the instrument. The authorities are, of course, 
opposed to this view. See Power of the Legislature to call 
a Constitutional Convention, 97 Central Law Journal, page 
368, Note 1. See also Jameson, Sec. 538-540. 
I t would serve no useful purpose to set forth judicial con-
structions or definitions of the word "amendment." I t was 
used in our Constitution in what might be called the con-
ventional sense. I t refers merely and solely to incidental 
changes in the instrument itself, even though such changes 
might be of a momentous nature. 
A new Constitution cannot be adopted by the procedure 
outlined in Article X I I I of the Constitution itself and if 
i t is not permissible for the people of this state to effect 
changes in the instrument revising i t in toto, then the rights 
of sovereignty may no longer be considered as vested in the 
people of this state and it becomes anomalous and inaccurate 
to describe these sovereign privileges as inalienable. In 
the light of the authorities and in the light of precedent, 
particularly precedents established in our sister Common-
wealth after the decision hereinafter discussed in 6 Cushing, 
573, was handed down, there would seem to be no basis for 
the view tha t a Constitutional Convention may not be called 
for the purpose of revising the Constitution of this state; 
and, if the General Assembly, acting for this especial pur-
pose as the agents of a sovereign body, decide tha t a Con-
stitutional Convention is necessary and advisable in order 
to alter and revise the Constitution of this State, and in 
pursuance or execution of this decision, by appropriate 
legislation, provide for the calling of such a Convention, it 
is too late to contend tha t such action is invalid or illegal 
for whatever cause. See Jameson, Constitutional Conven-
tions, pages 210, 211. 
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II. 
The General Assembly may by appropriate legislation 
provide for the holding of a Constitutional Convention 
and for the election at the instance of the Governor of 
delegates to this Convention. 
At the outset, it should be borne in mind that the 
Legislature, in calling a Constitutional Convention, acts as 
the agent of the people in so doing; in other words, it is 
speaking for the ultimate sovereignty, the people. Jameson 
states that this important function is exercised by the Legis-
lature, as an historical matter, because in his language it 
is particularly well fitted for the task. See Jameson, 
Constitutional Conventions, Section 121. There is, how-
ever, respectable authority for the view that the Legislature 
must first submit the question of the advisability of calling 
a Constitutional Convention to the people for their ap-
proval or disapproval. 
State vs. Dahl 6 N. P . 81 at 87, supra/ Hoar, Con-
stitutional Conventions, page 73. 
However, the opposing principle represents, it is sub-
mitted, the sounder view. There is certainly excellent 
precedent in the history of this state for the proposition that 
the Legislature may call a Constitutional Convention with-
out first obtaining popular approval of this proceeding. 
The Constitution of 1842 was adopted in this very manner 
(Acts and Resolves of 1842, June Session, p. 3) and the 
entire proceedings met with the unqualified approval of 
Webster in connection with his argument in the case of 
Luther vs. Borden, supra. I t might be stated at this point 
that in this case the defendants introduced in evidence the 
entire proceedings under which the Rhode Island Constitu-
tional Convention was called in 1842 and the instrument 
itself as finally approved and adopted by the people. The 
record, from the standpoint of the defendants, consists 
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almost entirely of evidence of this character. Nowhere in 
the arguments of either counsel or in the body of the de-
cision itself is there the slightest intimation that the Con-
stitutional Convention acted without authority in that the 
people had not, prior to the holding of the Convention, 
passed upon the advisability of calling and holding it. The 
resourceful and scholarly counsel for the plaintiff would 
have undoubtedly seized upon this fact, if the omission 
were considered serious or vital. True it is that, until the 
adoption of this Constitution, the state government was 
functioning under its original charter. I t is difficult to find 
any logical basis for distinction in this fact. The state 
government fundamentally, that is, from the standpoint of 
the exercise of sovereign rights by the people, was the same 
after 1789, or perhaps more accurately af ter 1776, as it is 
today; this is particularly true in the light of the provisions 
of Section 10 of Article IV of the present Constitution under 
the language of which the General Assembly continued to 
exercise af ter 1842 all of the powers that they had previously 
exercised, except to the extent that they were prohibited in 
the Constitution, prior to the adoption of the present instru-
ment. That various powers originally granted to the Gen-
eral Assembly under the charter still subsist to a very 
marked degree in many important particulars is evident 
from the recent decision of this Court in City of Providence 
vs. Moulton, 52 R. I., 236; particularly relevant is the com-
ment of the Court at pages 240, 241, seriatim, of the opinion. 
See also Horton vs. City of Newport, 27 R. I., 283, 291. 
The authorities hereinafter set forth indicate clearly that 
the Legislature has the inherent right, in the absence of an 
express constitutional prohibition, to call a Constitutional 
Convention; i ts authority to do so is not dependent on any 
enabling provisions in the original charter; but if the Gen-
eral Assembly must look to the charter for such power, then 
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Section 10 of Article IV certainly clothes it with this 
power. 
Dodd seems to prefer, as a matter of expediency, the 
prior submission to the people of the question of the ad-
visability and desirability of calling a Constitutional Con-
vention, but states unqualifiedly that the method to be 
followed rests in the sound discretion of the Legislature; 
in other words, compliance with such a provision is, in 
effect, directory rather than mandatory. 
See Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State 
Constitutions, pages 46-47. 
Jameson discusses this matter at some length, and while 
he speaks commendably of the practice of submitting the 
question first to the people for action thereon, nevertheless, 
expresses the thought that such action is by no means a 
condition precedent to the valid calling of a Constitutional 
Convention. This learned author speaks, it is submitted, 
authoritatively on all questions having to do with the 
amendment of State Constitutions through the medium of 
Constitutional Conventions. Cooley says of his work, from 
which we have so constantly cited: 
"This work is so complete and satisfactory in its 
treatment of the general subject as to leave little to 
be said by one who shall afterwards attempt to cover 
the same ground." 
See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edi-
tion, page 88, Note 1. 
To revert, therefore, to the views of Mr. Jameson on this 
important phase of the present question, we quote from his 
work as follows: 
"I t is too late to deny the right of a Legislature, in 
the absence of express constitutional authority, to call 
a convention, and in general impose upon i t conditions 
in relation to its organization, and to some extent, its 
proceedings. Though doubtless considered irregular in 
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its earlier stages, the usage has become established for 
Legislatures to take the initiative in such cases, as of 
course; and since the year 1820, when the New York 
Council of Revision vetoed a Convention Bill because 
the Legislature had passed i t without providing for a 
submission of it to the people, not as being beyond its 
power, but as inexpedient, the power has very fre-
quently been exercised." 
See Jameson, page 389, quoted in 97 Central Law 
Journal, supra, a t page 370. 
For the opinion of the Council for the New York Revision, 
see Jameson, Appendix F. 
Earlier in the work (Section 123), the author states along 
the same lines that the Conventions may be called under 
two different situations: (1) where the Legislature calls 
it and (2) where it merely recommends the calling of the 
Convention to the people and withholds final action until 
after popular approval or disapproval. 
An examination of the New York decision or ruling will 
indicate that i t was based only on matters of expediency 
or perhaps out of practical considerations of economy. At 
all events, the veto was not rendered on the ground that the 
action was illegal in tha t the Legislature failed in the first 
instance to obtain "the sense of the people," but simply be-
cause such action, out of an abundance of caution, seemed 
to be the prudent course to pursue. 
In Wells vs. Bain, supra, 75 Pa. 39 a t 49, the Court, dis-
cussing the various methods of calling the Convention, 
states: 
"The form of the law is immaterial in this question 
of derivative authority. I t may be an invitation in the 
first place as was the act of 1789 under which the 
Convention of 1790 was convened and an authority to 
the people to meet in primary assemblies to select dele-
gates and confer on them unrestricted powers, or i t 
may be a law to take the sense of the people on the 
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question of calling a convention and then a law to make 
the call and confer the powers the people intend to 
confer upon their agents." 
See also Power of Legislature to call a Constitu-
tional Convention, 97 Central Law Journal 
368-372 (1924). 
On principle, it is obvious that there is no substantial 
reason why the General Assembly cannot, of its own initia-
tive, call a Constitutional Convention. If the legislation 
were designed with a view to enabling the Convention to 
act upon and adopt a Constitution with finality, that is, 
without ultimate submission to the people, there would 
obviously be a sound basis for serious complaint with the 
method suggested. Such a procedure—although there 
seems to be precedent for it—goes to the very brink of the 
bounds that circumscribe the activities of legislative agents. 
But, in the instant case, the calling of a Constitutional 
Convention amounts in final analysis to nothing more nor 
less than a formal or ministerial act. The only act of really 
vital consequence is the final action taken by the people on 
the matter of ratifying or repudiating the work of the Con-
vention. This is the bulwark that assures and guarantees 
a truly republican form of Government and the adoption of 
an instrument or Constitution that meets with popular ap-
proval. Compared with this, the mere calling of the Con-
stitutional Convention, in an orderly fashion with proper 
safeguards provided in the legislative act itself, is a rela-
tively inconsequential act. I t would seem, therefore, that 
both on principle and precedent, legal and factual, or his-
torical, the General Assembly may properly call on its own 
initiative a Constitutional Convention for the purpose of 
revising the present Constitution. 
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III. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in "Opinion of the 
Justices," 14 R. I. 649, affords no effectual bar to the 
calling and holding of a Constitutional Convention for the 
purpose of revising the existing Constitution and the sub-
mission of the Constitution so revised to the people for 
their approved or disapproval. 
The Opinion of the Justices handed down in 1883 is sub-
ject, from the standpoint of its reasoning and intrinsic logic, 
to most serious criticism in tha t i t presumes that the people 
of this state, a t the time of the adoption of the Constitution 
of 1842, surrendered and ceded, by implication, for all time 
their sovereign privilege of revising their Constitution. A 
conclusion involving a complete surrender of such sovereign 
principles should be based only upon express language 
couched in unmistakable terms tha t admitted of no other 
construction. 
From the standpoint of the opinion constituting a pre-
cedent binding on this Court, i t might fur ther be stated 
that no such significance should be attached to the decision 
because 
(1) it is only advisory in character and in no jurisdiction 
would it be regarded, because of this very fact, as affording 
a binding precedent. For a discussion of this matter, see 
"Constitution Making In Rhode Island" by Amasa M. Eaton, 
Page XXII , an excellent work on the general subject and 
"Opinion on the calling of a Constitutional Convention in 
Rhode Island " pages 9 to 18, both pamphlets being available 
in the State Law Library. See also "Memorandum on the 
Legal Effect of Opinions given by Judges'' by J . B. Thayer, 
Dean of Harvard Law School, in "Changing the Constitu-
tions of the States, Especially Rhode Island " 
(2) the decision is based on a misconception or at least a 
misinterpretation of a similar decision in Massachusetts, 
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viz., Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. For a discussion 
with reference to the unsoundness of the Massachusetts de-
cision, see Jameson, Section 393-395. Incidentally, both the 
decision of our own Court and the Massachusetts decision 
are frequently referred to as being "generally discredited." 
(3) the Court based its decision on the application of a 
maxim that was completely irrelevant not merely because 
of the fact that its application is confined almost exclusively 
to contracts, deeds, etc., but primarily because of the fact 
that the Legislature was not seeking to amend the Consti-
tution through the medium of a Convention but rather to 
revise it. Conceivably the maxim might have had some 
application had the Legislature been seeking to amend the 
Constitution rather than revise i t ; under these circum-
stances, it might well be said by the Court that the instru-
ment having set forth an explicit method for accomplishing 
the amendment, no other method was permissible, all other 
methods having, by implication, been abrogated or revoked. 
Were it possible to revise the Constitution under Article 
XIII , there might be some basis for the maxim's application 
but a revision, as stated above, under Article X I I I is not 
possible. 
Jameson, Sections 538-540. 
No particular deference seems to have been shown by 
contemporaries of either state for the decisions. Justice 
Morton, who was on the bench at the time that the decision 
reported in 6 Cush. was handed down, later attended the 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853 and gave 
to it his hearty support. The validity of the Convention's 
action was staunchly defended by Honorable Joel Parker, 
former Chief Justice of the State of New Hampshire. Such 
eminent constitutional lawyers as Rufus Choate attended 
this Convention and raised absolutely no question whatso-
ever as to its validity or essential legality. 
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See Minority Report of the Joint Special Committee on 
Constitutional Changes made to the General Assembly, 
January Session, 1887, State Law Library. 
See generally "The Assault on the Constitution" 
Providence Sunday Journal, February 3, 1935. 
Both the Massachusetts and the Rhode Island decisions 
were, considering the momentous character of the questions 
involved, decided with the utmost haste. In the communi-
cation that presumably accompanied the Massachusetts de-
cision, the Court said: 
"We cannot close this communication without ex-
pressing our regret that questions of so much delicacy 
and importance should be presented under circum-
stances which have given but a few hours for conferring 
together and reducing our opinion to writing. Neither 
of us had either examined or thought of the questions 
until a f ter the reference was made and it was not 
until this day that we were able to meet and consult 
together on the subject." 
Jameson, Sec. 393, p. 386. 
The time given by the Massachusetts Court to the ques-
tion was extremely brief as compared to the altogether too 
brief period given to deliberation by our own Court. 
The opinion is, therefore, no effective obstacle in the path 
of a decision to the contrary by this Court. I ts significance, 
because of the fact that the opinion is advisory in nature, 
depends entirely on the reasoning and logic, or the absence 
thereof, inherent in the decision itself. Anything more than 
a most casual study and examination of the opinion compels 
the conclusion that the reasoning of the Court and its con-
clusions are patently unsound. 
General Conclusion 
We have not endeavored to answer categorically the ques-
tions propounded by His Excellency, the Governor. We feel, 
however, that with one exception, all questions are answered 
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in the foregoing discussion covering the general subject mat-
ter of the functions of Constitutional Conventions and the 
circumstances under which, and the methods by which, they 
may be called by a legislative body. We desire, however, 
without having given any especial thought to the matter 
based upon extended research, to make at least passing 
comment as to the eligibility of the general officers of the 
State (question (c)) to act as members of the Convention 
solely by virtue of their incumbency. 
Consistent with the thought hereinbefore set forth, it is 
our opinion that all delegates to the Convention should be 
elected by the people. For this reason, it is our offhand 
opinion that the General Officers of the State should not, 
merely by reason of the fact that they are now actual incum-
bents in office, be members of the Convention, a t least to the 
extent of being eligible to vote on any controversial matter. 
I t might very well be, subject to the limitation that they 
shall not be entitled to vote on a matter that is the subject 
of controversy and in connection with which their votes 
might result in the passage or defeat of the matter in dis-
pute, that, ex officio, the Governor might preside at this Con-
vention, the Secretary of State tabulate the votes and attend 
to ministerial matters for which his office is especially fitted, 
and the Attorney General assist the delegates in the solution 
of any legal problems that might arise. 
We desire, however, that the Honorable Court shall treat 
this comment only in the nature of a suggestion, as we leave 
the final determination of this particular question to the 
sound discretion and judgment of the Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H . Q U I N N , 
W I L L I A M A . G R A H A M , 
As Amici Curiae. 
With whom MICHAEL D E CIANTIS was on the brief. 
State of Rhode Island 
SUPREME COURT 
In Re: 
THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNOR FOR AN OPIN-
ION W I T H R E F E R E N C E TO THE HOLDING OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDA FILED BY PAT-
RICK H. QUINN, WILLIAM A. GRAHAM AND MI-
CHAEL DeCIANTIS IN ADDITION TO THEIR MAIN 
BRIEF. 
POINT "A" 
The Constitution of Rhode Island in Express Terms 
Clothes the General Assembly with the Power to Call 
a Constitutional Convention. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 1, Article 1, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, 
quoting Washington's language, declares the right of the 
people to make and alter their constitutions of government. 
The question therefore arises—how may said provision be 
carried into effect? May all of the people assemble in some 
super town meeting fashion to make such changes and alter-
ations? As a practical proposition, such an assemblage is 
quite out of the question. Indeed, i t is hard to conceive that 
procedure of that kind would be a peaceful assembly. 
The framers of the present constitution must have had in 
mind a peaceful, practical and workable method of assem-
bling the people to carry out the powers reserved to them in 
Section 1 of Article 1. If they had it in mind, did they make 
provision for it in tlie constitution? Counsel on this brief 
think they did, in Section 1 of Article 4. 
Article 3 of our State constitution distributes the powers 
of the State government into three departments,—legisla-
tive, executive and judicial. 
Article 4, Section 2, vests all legislative powers in the gen-
eral assembly. Section 1 of said Article 4 reads as follows: 
"This constitution shall be the supreme law of the state, 
and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void. The 
general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry 
this constitution into effect" 
What is a fair interpretation of the last fourteen words 
of this section? Do they not clearly mean that the legisla-
ture not only "may", but "shall", provide the necessary ma-
chinery for carrying into effect every part of the constitu-
tion? 
There is no express provision in the Rhode Island consti-
tution which prohibits the general assembly from calling a 
constitutional convention. Wherefore, the assembly's power 
in that regard appears to be unlimited by reason of the 
absence from the constitution of detailed provision whereby 
the people can take advantage of and exercise the rights 
given them under Section 1 of Article 1. The legislature is 
the only body that can provide the finances necessary for the 
holding of a constitutional convention. 
In considering the power of the legislature, helpful lan-
guage will be found in the decision of this Court in Provi-
dence vs. Moulton, 52 R. I. 236, especially commencing at 
page 240. 
At page 241 the Court calls attention to the fact that the 
constitution defines the powers given to the executive and 
judicial departments of the government, and that 
"All other powers of government are given to the legis-
lative department, unless prohibited in the constitu-
tion." 
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If the legislature cannot act under Section 10 of Article 
4, or Section 1 of Article 4, then Section 1 of Article 1 be-
comes obsolete and useless. We believe that the cases which 
have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States 
under Section 4 of Article 4 of the United States Constitu-
tion are analogous to the case at bar. Section 4 of Article 4 
of the United States Constitution guarantees to every state 
a republican form of government, in the same manner in 
which the Rhode Island constitution gives the people the 
right to make or alter its constitutions. The federal consti-
tution is silent as to how the foregoing section can be car-
ried into effect—the same situation that we have in the 
Rhode Island constitution. The courts, however, have de-
cided that Congress may carry into effect Section 4 of 
Article 4, and that the guarantee is primarily a legislative 
power and it resides in the Congress. We contend that the 
same theory applies in the case at bar. The power to carry 
into effect Section 1 of Article 1 of our State constitution 
resides in the legislature—not impliedly, but in express 
terms under Section 1 of Article 4. 
Texas vs. White, 7 Wall. 730. 
Marshall vs. Dyer, 231 U. S. 250. 
Mt. Timber Co. vs. Washington, 243 U. S. 219. 
Pac. States Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118. 
A Pertinent Quotation from Mr. Cooley 
At page 84 (Vol. 1, Eighth Edition) of his excellent work, 
this distinguished constitutional authority uses the follow-
ing language: 
"II In the original States, and all other subsequently 
admitted to the Union, the power to amend or revise 
their constitutions resides in the great body of the 
people as an organized body politic, who, being vested 
with ultimate sovereignty, and the source of all State 
authority, have power to control and alter at will the 
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law which they have made. But the people, in the 
legal sense, must be understood to be those who, by the 
existing constitution, are clothed with political rights, 
and who, while that instrument remains, will be the 
sole organs through which the will of the body politic 
can be expressed. 
"III But the will of the people to this end can only 
be expressed in the legitimate modes by which such a 
body politic can act, and which must either be pre-
scribed by the constitution whose revision or amend-
ment is sought, or by an act of the legislative depart-
ment of the State, which alone would be authorized to 
speak for the people upon this subject, and to point 
out a mode for the expression of their will in the 
absence of any provision for amendment or revision 
contained in the constitution itself." 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H . QUINN_, 
W I L L I A M A . G R A H A M , 
MICHAEL D E C I A N T I S , 
As Amici Curiae. 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S u p r e m e Court 
In Re: REQUEST OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THEODORE 
FRANCIS GREEN, GOVERNOR O F T H E 
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVI-
DENCE PLANTATIONS, FOR AN OPINION AS 
TO THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION FOR 
THE CALLING AND HOLDING OF A CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
BRIEF OF 
THOMAS F. COONEY 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
Supreme Court 
In Re: Request of His Excellency, Theodore Francis 
Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, for an Opinion as to the 
Validity of Legislation for the Calling and Holding 
of a Constitutional Convention. 
BRIEF OF THOMAS F. COONEY 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This brief, through the courtesy of the Court, is submitted 
with reference to the proposition— 
Have the General Assembly constitutional com-
petency to enact a law authorizing the election of 
delegates by the people to participate in a conven-
tion to revise the Constitution? 
The writer submits they have such power. 
ARGUMENT 
(1) By way of preface to the consideration of the re-
quests submitted to the Court by Governor Green, there is 
an important inquiry to be determined here and now. Can 
the Constitution be revised at this time in any other mode 
than by a convention called for such purpose? 
The Constitution is silent in regard to revision by means 
of a convention. The significance of this omission is dis-
cussed elsewhere in this argument. 
128 
Article XIII "Of Amendments": 
"The general assembly may propose amendments to 
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the 
members elected to each house. Such propositions for 
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and 
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of 
state, with the names of all the members who shall have 
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town 
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions shall 
be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or notices 
by them issued, for warning the next annual town and 
ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall read said 
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with 
the names of all the representatives and senators who 
shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before 
the election of senators and representatives shall be had. 
If a majority of all the members elected to each house, 
at said annual meeting, shall approve any proposition 
thus made, the same shall be published and submitted 
to the electors in the mode provided in the act of ap-
proval; and if then approved by three-fifths of the 
electors of the state present and voting thereon in town 
and ward meetings, it shall become a part of the con-
stitution of the state." 
By the adoption of Art. XI, Sec. 2, "Of Amendments", in 
November 1900, the date of town and ward meetings was 
transferred from the first Wednesday "in April" to "the 
Tuesday after the first Monday in November Sec. 12 of that 
article annulled specifically several sections of Art. VII of 
the Constitution "elections"; Sec. 11 of Art. IV "of the legis-
lative power" and of Art. III of the Constitution "and all 
other provisions of the Constitution inconsistent herewith 
are hereby annulled" 
Inasmuch as Sec. 2 of Art. XI "Of Amendments" changed 
the date of town and ward meetings to "the Tuesday after 
the first Monday of November to that extent it is incon-
sistent with the provisions of Art. XIII of the Constitution 
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"Of Amendments" which required proposals for amendment 
to the Constitution to be submitted to the electors at "the 
next annual meeting." That meeting was "in April." It was, 
and is, annulled. It can not now be complied with. 
Art. XVI "Of Amendments," adopted in November 1911, 
provided for biennial elections "at town, ward and district 
meetings on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in No-
vember. Nine amendments have been adopted since the adop-
tion of Art. XI "Of Amendments" in 1900. So far, I have 
been unable to find any reference in any of them to an 
amendment of Art. XIII of the Constitution which provided 
explicitly that proposals for amendment were to be submit-
ted to the electors at the town and ward meetings "in April". 
It is to be noted that "if a majority of all the members 
elected to each house, at said annual meeting shall approve 
any proposition thus made, the same shall be published and 
submitted to the electors in the mode provided in the act of 
approval; if then approved by three-fifths of the electors of 
the state present and voting thereon in town and ward meet-
ings, it shall become a part of the Constitution of the State." 
If, as is the fact, there can be no election in April there can, 
therefore, be no "majority of all the members elected to each 
house, at said annual meeting," to approve of a proposal to 
amend the Constitution. It is to be observed that by the plain 
terms of Art. XIII each and all of the several steps stated 
are to be carried out as conditions precedent before the pro-
posal, shall become a part of the Constitution of the State. 
This creates a void in the Constitution which renders im-
possible the adoption of specific amendments as was the prac-
tice prior to the adoption of Art, XI, Sec. 2 "Of Amend-
ments". The omission for any reason to execute any of the 
prescribed requirements of Art. XIII makes it legally impos-
sible to adopt any specific amendment by that mode. 
Where, then, is the matter of changing the Constitution 
by specific amendment left? It appears that those entrusted 
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with the duty of bringing the various articles of the Consti-
tution into a harmonious whole have overlooked the indis-
pensable substitute for the provisions of Art. XIII of the 
Constitution which looked to town or ward meetings "in 
April." It also required that a "majority of the members 
elected to each house at said annual meeting should approve 
any proposition thus made." Such a majority is not now ob-
tainable. 
By adoption of Sec. 2 of Art. XI, "Of Amendments," it has 
become impossible to submit proposals of specific amendment 
to the Constitution to town or ward meetings in April. It is 
clear, therefore, that if the Constitution is to be revised, it 
must be brought about through the act of a convention called 
for that purpose and not otherwise. 
All the authorities on the subject agree that if the Consti-
tution contains no provision for its revision a convention for 
such purpose is not only a legal mode, it is, in fact, the only 
possible mode available at this time. 
"And what's impossible, can't be, 
And never, never comes to pass." 
"In Re, Constitutional Convention," 14 R. I. 649, at 653: 
"If our Constitution had no provision for amendment, 
then, indeed, a power in the Assembly to call a conven-
tion or to initiate amendment in some other manner 
might be implied 'ex necessitate'. The Assembly, un-
der the charter, exercised such a power because the 
charter had no such provision; though it is proper to 
remark that under the charter the legislative power of 
the Assembly was practically unlimited. Again, if the 
provision for amendment was impracticable, there 
might be, if no legal reason, yet some excuse for disre-
garding it." 
It is apparent that since November 1900 it has been con-
tinuously impracticable to submit proposals of amendment 
to the electors as prescribed in Art. XIII. 
Chief Justice Durfee, in 14 R. I. 649, held that this was, or 
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might, be a sufficient reason to warrant the calling of con-
vention to revise the Constitution. A convention is, there-
fore, the only mode open at this time by which the people, 
in the exercise of their "essential and unquestionable" sov-
ereign right "to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment" can revise their fundamental law in accordance with 
the provisions of Art. I, Sec. 1: 
"In the words of the Father of his Country, we declare 
that 'the basis of our political systems is the right of the 
people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment; but that the constitution which at any time 
exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of 
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all'." 
(2) "In limine" the Court is called upon to determine 
the nature of the proposition under review. 
Conceding that there is considerable authority to the con-
trary outside of this state, the writer submits that, viewed 
in the light of the law first declared by the Court in the 
trial of Thomas W. Dorr, at Newport, 1845, for treason, 
Chief Justice Job Durfee, father of Chief Justice Thomas 
Durfee, held the problem to be a political one. 
"Courts take notice, without proof offered from the bar, 
what the Constitution is or was and who is or was the 
Governor of their own State. It belongs to the Legisla-
ture to exercise this high duty. It is the Legislature 
which in the exercise of its delegated sovereignty counts 
the votes and declares whether a constitution be adopted 
or a Governor elected or not, and we can not revise or 
reverse their acts in this particular, without usurping 
their power. And why not? Because if we did so we 
would cease to be a mere judicial, and become a political 
tribunal, with the whole sovereignty in our hands, and, 
neither the people nor the legislature would be sov-
ereign; we should be sovereign, or you would be sov-
ereign. Sovereignty is above courts and juries, and the 
creature can not sit in judgment upon his creator." 
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A scrutiny of the personnel of the convention which formu-
lated the Constitution will disclose that he was a member 
from Tiverton. Presumably, he was well informed of the 
{towers and limitations of the instrument produced by him 
and his associates. 
The view expressed by Chief Justice Job Durfee in that 
rase was confirmed by Chief Justice of the United States 
Roger Brooke Taney, speaking for a unanimous court on the 
point, in the leading case of Luther vs. Barden, 7 How. 1. 
That case was an aftermath of the Dorr agitation which led 
to the adoption of the Constitution. 
"The political department has always determined 
whether the proposed Constitution or the amendment 
was ratified or not, by the people of the State; and the 
judicial power has followed its decisions." 
Referring to Rhode Island decisions, the Court in that case 
said: 
"But the Court uniformly held that the inquiry pro-
posed to be made belonged to the political power, and 
not to the judicial. That it rested with the political 
power whether the charter government had been dis-
placed or not; and when that decision was made, the 
judicial department would be bound to take notice of 
it as the paramount law of the State." 
And again: 
"If it (the Court) decides at all as a Court, it neces-
sarily affirms the existence and authority of the govern-
ment under which it is exercising a judicial power." 
In White vs. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, a case which was heard 
before the United States Supreme Court in which the validity 
of the Constitution of the State of Georgia was denied, it 
was held: 
"The action of Congress upon the subject can not be 
inquired into. This case is clearly one in which the 
judicial is bound to follow the action of the political de-
partment of the government and is concluded by it." 
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Judge Bradley's article develops the point that the pending 
problem is political. 
If such be the law in this jurisdiction, the duty of the Court 
ends here. The question of whether or not a constitutional 
convention may be held is to be determined exclusively by the 
Assembly, the political arm of the state vested with such 
power in Art. IV, Sec. 10, of the Constitution. 
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336 Ann. Cases, 1915 C. That 
case contains an exhaustive recital of authorities in support 
of the view that the question involved here is judicial and 
to be determined by this tribunal. 
Dodd, "Revision of State Const.," p. 214, Ann. Cases, 1915 
C, p. 200, cites Luther vs. Borden as contra. It speaks of 
that case as one "which involved the episode in the history 
of our country known as 'Dorr's Rebellion'." The important 
feature is that it deals with the Constitution of Rhode 
Island. 
If the second contention of the writer is sound, the ques-
tions should be relegated to the General Assembly to ar-
range, in their discretion, to call a convention to revise the 
Constitution. 
(3) Assuming that the Court should hold that the ques-
tions are judicial to be determined by the Court, in view of 
the fundamental and extremely delicate situation involved 
here out of a due regard for a co-ordinate branch of the gov-
ernment, the Court should presume plenary power in the 
Assembly. 
The burden of proof beyond to establish beyond a reason-
able doubt the unconstitutionality of such an act is upon 
those who challenge the authority of the Assembly. "Under 
the charter the legislative power was practically unlimited." 
In re, Const. Con., 14 R. I. 649, at 653. 
Fritz vs. Presbrey, 44 R. I. 207. 
East Shore Land Co. vs. Peckham, 33 R. I. 341. 
City of Providence vs. Moult on, 52 R. I. 236. 
Miller vs. Clark, 47 R. I. 13. 
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In the matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230, at 240: 
"There can be no doubt that an act of the general assem-
bly not warranted by the constitutional powers vested 
in that body, can not have the force of law, and that it 
is the duty of this court, when properly called upon, so 
to declare. Yet this is a high and important judicial 
power, not to be exercised lightly, 'nor in any case,' to 
borrow the language of a learned court, 'where it cannot 
be made to appear plainly that the legislature have ex-
ceeded their powers.' It is always to be presumed, that 
any act passed by the legislature is conformable to the 
constitution, and has the force of law, until the con-
trary is clearly shown." 
Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. at 345: "The question before us is, 
substantially, whether, when in 1843, the people of this state 
adopted a constitution, they" retained their ancient sovereign 
right to "make and alter their constitutions of government" 
by means of a convention called for that purpose by an act 
of the General Assembly, Art. XIII of the Constitution "Of 
Amendments" to the contrary notwithstanding? In the 
words of Judge Ames 
"This can properly be ascertained only by attention to 
the clauses of the constitution bearing upon this subject 
by taking into view their origin and received construc-
tion when adopted, if they had any; and by the applica-
tion to them of the usual rules of interpretation. 
"These clauses are," 
ARTICLE I . 
Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Princi-
ples. 
"In order effectually to secure the religious and political 
freedom established by our venerated ancestors, and to pre-
serve the same for our posterity, we do declare that the es-
sential and unquestionable rights and principles hereinafter 
mentioned shall be established, maintained and preserved, 
and shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, ju-
dicial, and executive proceedings." 
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"Section 1. In the words of the Father of his Country, 
we declare that 'the basis of our political systems is the right 
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment ; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till 
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, 
is sacredly obligatory upon all'." 
"Art. IV, Sec. 10. The general assembly shall continue to 
exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless 
prohibited in this constitution." 
"Art. I, Sec. 23. The enumeration of the foregoing rights 
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by 
the people." * * ' ' ' 
Taylor vs. Place, at 347,— 
"We have purposely arranged these clauses of the Con-
stitution together, because they ail relate to the subject 
under consideration, and must be viewed and construed 
in their bearings upon each other, if we would arrive 
at the result,—--their true meaning as a whole. Looking 
at them in* this way, no on at all familiar with such 
subjects and the established principles which govern 
them, can, we think, fail to perceive the unity of design 
and purpose manifested in them." 
6 R. C. L., 51, Sec. 46: 
"Existing Conditions and History.—It is settled by 
very high authority that in placing a construction on a 
constitution, or any clause or part thereof, a court 
should look to the history of the times, and examine the 
state of things existing when the constitution was 
framed and adopted, in order to ascertain the old law, 
the mischief and the remedy. Constitutions, like 
statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of 
conditions existing at the time of their adoption, and 
the general spirit of the times and the prevailing senti-
ments among the people. Reference may be made to the 
historical facts relating to the original or political con-
stitutions of the community and to prior well-known 
practices and wages" Citing State vs. Narragansett, 16 
R. I. 424, at 439; 
136 
C. J. Durfee: 
"The courts concede to state legislatures a legislative 
power which is limited only by the Constitution, and 
they are therefore careful not to declare a statute un-
constitutional until they are clear that it is so. They 
assume that the legislators, being bound by their oaths 
to support the Constitution, consider, when any act is 
proposed for passage, whether it can be constitutionally 
passed, and do not vote for the passage of it until every 
doubt has been quieted. In this view a becoming defer-
ence to the legislature inculcates caution. 'The ques-
tion whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the 
Constitution,' says Chief Justice Marshall, 'is at all 
times a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, 
if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful 
case'. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128. The rule 
generally laid down is, that statutes should be sustained 
unless their unconstitutionality is clear beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, A reasonable doubt, is to be resolved in 
favor of the legislative action, and the act sustained. 
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 182 and cases 
cited. Before an act is declared to be unconstitutional 
it should clearly appear that it cannot be supported by 
any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption.' 
People vs. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235, 241. 'All 
intendments favor constitutionality.' Crowley vs. State 
of Oregon, 11 Oregon, 512. 'Courts will approach the 
question with great caution, examine it in every possible 
aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and 
patient attention can throw any new light on the sub-
ject, and never declare a statute void unless the nullity 
and invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.' Wellington et al., Peti-
tioners, 16 Pick, 87, 95, per Shaw, C. J. 'It is but a de-
cent, respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the 
patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is 
passed,' says Justice Washington, 'to presume in favor 
of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is 
proved beyond all reasonable doubt.' Ogden vs. Saun-
ders, 12 Wheat, 213, 270. Of course if courts are bound 
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to be thus careful where a single statute involving a 
doubt has been passed, it behooves them to be still more 
careful, if possible, after several such statutes have been 
passed from time to time by different legislatures, with-
out either question or protest. A long continued legis-
lative construction is entitled to great weight with the 
courts, if not clearly erroneous." 
The writer has purposely quoted the author of the advisory 
opinion "In Re, Constitutional Convention," 14. R. I. 649, at 
length in order to emphasize the point that, if he had consid-
ered the requests submitted to the Court in that case by the 
Senate in the light of the authorities he quoted, and had ap-
plied to them the rules which he stated in 16 R. I. 424, it is 
quite in order to presume that this court would not have been 
called upon to answer the requests presented here by Gover-
nor Green. "Quod erat demonstrandum." 
This is the more obvious when it is borne in mind that, as 
the author of 14 R. I. in "Some Thoughts on the Constitu-
tion," issued in reply to the article of Judge Bradley in crit-
icism of 14 R. I., made it clear that when he wrote the opinion 
in 14 R. I., he knew of the passage of two acts in the Assembly 
of 1853 which allowed electors to determine whether or not 
they desired to have a convention called to revise the Con-
stitution. 
He not only did not undertake in 14 R. I. to distinguish 
those laws from the questions submitted by the Senate in 
that case, he ignored all mention of them. No explanation of 
the silence on the point in 14 R. I. is offered in "Some 
Thoughts on the Constitution" wherein they are dealt upon 
with much detail. 
It affords a striking illustration of— 
"Incidis in Scyllam cupiens vitare Charybdim." 
"You fell upon Scylla, desiring to avoid Charybdis." 
If there is no essential difference in regard to those 
laws (and Judge Durfee's omission to say so leads directly to 
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such a conclusion) and the requests submitted by the Senate 
in 14 R. I. in arriving at the conclusion set out therein, he 
fell upon Scylla in desiring to avoid Charybdis; i. e., the acts 
of May and October 1853. 
(4) One of the controlling considerations, if not the con-
trolling consideration, arising out of this proceeding has to 
do with the extent of legislative power applicable under the 
Constitution as expressed in Art. IV, Sec. 10, which declares 
that "The general assembly shall continue to exercise the 
powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in 
this constitution " 
Chief Justice Ames, in Taylor vs. Place, at 360, declared: 
"This last clause, it will be observed, is mandatory upon 
the assembly to exercise the powers they have hereto-
fore exercised, unless prohibited; and it is manifest, 
that of these customary powers, the exercise of which 
they are commanded to continue, * * *." 
(5) The Court will observe that in this case certain words 
are set out in italics, the obvious purpose of which is to give 
added emphasis to the mandatory obligation of the Assembly 
to continue to exercise such powers after the adoption of the 
Constitution. With this mandatory duty imposed upon the 
Assembly of 1935 to continue to exercise the vast legal pow-
ers with which they are vested under Art. IV, Sec. 10, are 
they prohibited from issuing a call for a convention at this 
time? 
That the Assembly of 1853 believed it to be not only their 
right but their duty to continue to exercise the powers exer-
cised by their predecessors under the charter is apparent by 
the passage of the acts of May and October in 1853. 
In State vs. Narragansett, Judge Durfee, at p. 440, stressed 
the force of such conduct: 
"A long continued legislative construction is entitled to 
great weight by the Courts, if not clearly erroneous." 
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In 14 R. I., the court, although informed of those laws, 
did not hold the construction placed upon their powers 
by the Assembly in 1853 was clearly erroneous. If not errone-
ous in 1853, why should an attempt to exercise such power in 
1935 be held to be clearly erroneous? The Assembly have 
all the power at this time their predecessors of 1853 had. 
If it was constitutional for them to issue two calls for con-
ventions in 1853, why is it unconstitutional for their suc-
cessors in 1935 to follow their example? There has been no 
limitation imposed upon the present Assembly which did 
not operate upon that of 1853. 
(6) It is impossible to distinguish between the degrees 
of power granted to the several Assemblies. At least, no 
one has undertaken to point to such difference if it exists. 
The Court, in 14 R. I., did not do so nor did the author of 
"Some Thoughts on the Constitution" when discussing them. 
(7) Whence originates the supposed bar to the Assem-
bly of 1935 as it is phrased in 14 R. I. 649, at 650, 
"to call upon the electors to elect members to constitute 
a convention to frame a new Constitution of the State"? 
In Burke's Report (1844), an exhaustive review of 
the Dorrite controversy of 1842, there is contained a state-
ment of the "Peoples' Constitution," (This was a Dorrite 
production.) ; The "Landholders' Constitution" which was 
rejected by the electors and the present organic law. In each 
of the earlier documents may be found the language set out 
in Art. XIII "Of Amendments". "The general assembly may 
propose amendments 
On p. 11 of the "Journal of the Convention" of 1842 there 
is to be found a single line in regard to the adoption of that 
article. "Article XIII was taken up and after some discus-
sion was adopted." 
(8) From the time of Roger Williams, 1636-1683, down 
to March 30th, 1883, a period of two and a half centuries, less 
three years, in so far as a somewhat extended search for an-
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thority on the subject is concerned, the writer has been un-
able to locate anything which even remotely questions the 
power of the Assembly, despite Art. XIII, to call a conven-
tion to revise the Constitution. In the meantime the Assem-
bly had enacted four such laws before 1842 and two in 1853. 
The omission by everyone, so far as is known, for 247 years 
to question the power of the Assembly to do this develops 
such a general acceptance of power in our "venerated an-
cestors" as to reach demonstrative proof of its possession by 
the present Assembly, 14 R. I. 649 to the contrary notwith-
standing. 
6 R. C. L., pp. 62 and 65, 
Sec. 59, 60 and 61, at p. 64. 
(9) The suppositions bar to the Assembly of 1935 issu-
ing a call for the choice of delegates to a convention to revise 
the Constitution is assumed to be found in 14 R. I. 649 in 
an advisory opinion in which the Court answered questions 
it was not asked. What the Senate wanted to know was did 
the Assembly have the— 
( I ) "legal competency—to call upon the electors to 
elect members to constitute a convention to frame 
a new Constitution of the State." 
(II) "as to whether it is legally competent for the 
General Assembly to submit to the qualified elec-
tors the question whether the said electors will 
call a convention to frame a new Constitution 
(10) Nowhere in either of the inquiries addressed to the 
Court does the term "amendment" appear. It was unneces-
sary for the Senate to seek information from the Court in 
regard to the legal competency of the General Assembly to 
"propose amendments to this constitution 
They had plenary power to do that under Art. XIII. In 
a word, the Senate "asked for bread and they were given a 
stone." There does not seem to be any essential difference be-
tween not answering at all and responding to an inquiry 
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which was not propounded. The record in 14 R. I. 649 is an 
illustration of "Res ipsa loquitur" on the point. 
(11) The opinion in 14 R. I. was but advisory. Such 
opinions under the well settled law of Rhode Island "have 
no weight as precedents." 
Taylor vs. Place, 302. 
(12) Their inherent weakness is disclosed in Allen vs. 
Danielson, 15 R. I. 480. In that case the court overruled its 
advisory opinion in Knowles vs. Petitioner, 13 R. I. 90, say-
ing, p. 482: 
"But we have no doubt that we should have decided the 
case differently, if we had before us when we decided it, 
the same array of authorities which we have before us 
now. The question then is, shall we adhere to it out of 
regard for the maxim 'stare decisis,' or shall we adopt 
what we now consider the sounder rule? We have come 
to the conclusion that, considering how recently the 
case was decided, very little harm will come from over-
ruling it, and that by doing so we shall not only estab-
lish the correct rule, but also, which is no inconsiderable 
gain, establish the rule which is generally prevalent else-
where." 
It is difficult, perhaps, impossible to suggest language 
more apposite in the proceeding before the Court. 
(13) One of the patent weaknesses in 14 R. I., already 
referred to, is stated by its author as follows, on p. 655: 
"The questions are extremely important, and we should 
have been glad of an opportunity to give them a more 
careful study, but under the request of the Senate for 
our opinion, 'without any unnecessary delay,' * * *." 
The record shows that the request by the Senate was re-
ceived "on March 2ith inst." March 2Uh 1883 was Saturday. 
Presumably there was not much opportunity to bring the 
matter to the attention of all the members of the court on 
that day. March 25th 1883 was Sunday. It is not reasonable 
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to suggest that anything was done about it that day. If the 
Court sat at hearings on Monday, Wednesday and Friday 
of the week commencing March 26th 1883 it would not be at 
all likely that the inquiries were exhaustively considered on 
any of those dates. There is nothing that the writer has seen 
to indicate the hour on Friday, March 30th 1883, when the 
opinion was handed down. Why the haste? Judge Bradley 
offers an explanation. 
(14) The apology given for the unusual haste exempli-
fied in the case; viz., "without unnecessary delay," said noth-
ing more than is implied in the present proceeding. The re-
quests of Governor Green do not use language such as is 
found in 14 R. I. Notwithstanding such omission, the Court, 
out of due regard for the Chief Executive of the State, and 
having in mind the importance of his inquiries, will answer 
"without unnecessary delay." 
Judge Bradley, in his article, discusses that feature of the 
case. It is to be weighed by what was said of it by one who 
ought to know a great deal about it. 
Charles I of England said, "Never make a defence or 
apology before you are accused." The criticism of 14 R. I. 
by Judge Bradley suggests Milton in "Paradise Lost": 
"In her face excuse 
Came prologue, and apology too prompt." 
(15) 14 R. I. at 651 states as its reason for the opinion 
"Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." As pointed out by 
Judge Bradley, that maxim does not apply where there is 
another mode implicitly stated. That there is such another 
mode of revising the Constitution is clearly implied in Art. I, 
Sec. 1. The Constitution is unquestionably postulated upon 
the indestructible, unalienable sovereign right of the people 
"to make and alter their Constitutions of government" in 
such mode as our "venerated ancestors" did when they 
drafted the Constitution in 1842. 
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It was and is one of the rights retained by them and is 
vouchsafed to us of this generation, and we, in turn, are the 
trustees of it for our successors as electors by Sec. 23 of 
Art. L 
(16) Rawle on the Const., p. 17, quoted in Burke's Re-
port. 
The members of the convention that met at Newport 
and East Greenwich in June and November of 1842 were not 
empowered to minimize in the least that sovereign right, the 
exercise of which by them and their fellow citizens of that 
period was the sole warrant for their presence in that con-
vention. Neither can it be claimed with any show of reason 
that the electors who adopted their work by taking part in 
the referendum on the subject, expressly or impliedly, pro-
hibited themselves or their successors from holding another 
convention if and when they desired it. Nothing short of 
the most positive language amounting to proof to a moral 
certainty is sufficient to prohibit them if it be assumed that 
they had an antecedent sovereign right to do so. 
(17) The Court, in 14 R. I. at 654, referred to Taylor vs. 
Place as authority for the cogency of the maxim, "Expressio 
unius." Reference to that case at p. 358 shows that it is 
subject to a controlling qualification which was omitted in 
14 R. I.; viz., "The court may imply negative from affirma-
tive words, where the implication promotes, not where it de-
feats the intention " 
Rawle, as shown in Burke's Report, holds that such power 
was unalienable by the convention. 
(18) The writer of the opinion in 14 R. I. in "Some 
Thoughts on the Constitution" virtually concedes its un-
soundness in his admission that, if the convention of 1842 
had adopted the declaration of rights submitted by Mr. 
Ennis, of Newport, he would find it difficult to maintain Art. 
X I I I as the exclusive mode of revising the Constitution. 
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The Journal of the Convention, p. 7, shows that declara-
tion to be: 
"All political power and sovereignty are originally 
vested in and of right belong to the people. All free 
governments are founded in and their authority are 
established for the greater good of the whole number. 
The people have, therefore, an unalienable and inde-
feasible right in their original sovereign and unlimited 
capacity to alter, reform and change the same whenever 
their safety or happiness requires it." 
A contrast of Art. I, Sec. 1, with the foregoing does not 
disclose any essential difference. At least there is no such 
distinction between them which justifies the interpretation 
given in 14 R. I. 
A comparison of the Ennis statement with Art. I, Sec. 1, 
demonstrates that, if there is no difference in substance, the 
opinion in 14 R. I. is untenable here. This is virtually ad-
mitted in "Some Thoughts," etc. Delegate Ennis said noth-
ing more than what is taken for granted in the present dec-
laration of rights. It states that, "the essential and unques-
tionable rights", etc. 
In Sec. 1, Art. I, the framers by a complimentary reference 
to "the Father of His Country" simply predicated their as-
sertion on their sovereign rights implied in the preceding 
paragraph. The unsoundness of the premises being estab-
lished, the erroneous conclusion inevitable therefrom is to be 
disregarded. 
Rawle on the Const., p. 17, quoted in Burke's Report. 
(19) It is but an obvious truism to assert that the im-
plication of a negative applied to the unalienable sovereign 
right of the people to alter their constitution in a case where 
the language is restricted to their servants—Assembly—by 
the permissive phrase "The general assembly may propose 
amendments to their Constitution" is absolutely destructive 
of that which the "Declaration of Certain Constitutional 
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Rights and Principles," declares to be "essential and unques-
tionable" and "shall be established, maintained and pre-
served, and shall be of paramount obligation in all legisla-
tive, judicial and executive proceedings." 
It seems like "carrying coals to Newcastle" to elaborate 
upon the proposition that "exclusio unius" is wholly inap-
plicable to the sovereign right of the people to revise their 
Constitution by a convention. 
6 Am. and Eng. Enc., 2d ed., p. 902. 
Nunnemacher vs. State, 127 Wis. 190. 
Judge Bradley, p. 28-38 to 104. 
6 R. C. L. p. 49, Sec. 43 and 44. 
Cooley's Cons. Lim., 8th ed.. p. 85. 
Quoting Jameson: 
"N or is it true—that by the giving to the Legislature, in 
a Constitution express power to recommend specific 
amendments, involves by implication the denial to that 
body of power to call conventions for general revisions." 
State vs. Dahl, 9 N. D. 81, at 86: 
"Nor is it true, as intimated by the judges in the opinion, 
that the giving to the Legislature in a Constitution ex-
press power to recommend specific amendments to a 
constitution involves by implication, the denial to that 
body of power to call conventions for a general revision 
of it. We shall see in a subsequent part of this work 
that such a grant is applicable only to disconnected and 
unimportant amendments. It is obvious that a grant of 
power to propose such amendments in a summary man-
ner and without the formalities attending the enactment 
of fundamental laws can not be considered as an implied 
prohibition to effect a general revision." 
"And even when the only method provided in the Con-
stitution for its own modification is by legislative sub-
mission of amendments, the better doctrine seems to be 
that such provision, unless in terms restrictive, is per-
missive only, and does not preclude the calling of a con-
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stitutional convention under the implied powers of the 
legislative department." 
Ellingham vs. Dye Ann. Cases, 1915 C, 218. 
"Rawle on Constitution, p. 17: 
"But the best constitution which can be framed with 
the most anxious deliberation that can be bestowed 
upon it may, in practice, be found imperfect and inade-
quate to the true interests of society. Alterations and 
amendments then become desirable. The people retain 
—the people can not perhaps, divest themselves of the 
power to make such alterations" 
(20) 14 R. I. at 652 cites, "Chief Justice Shaw was of 
the same way of thinking," 6 Cush. 573. An examination of 
that case shows that the questions answered there are unlike 
those in 14 R. I. 
Roger Sherman Hoar, p. 46. 
As pointed out by Judge Bradley, the electors of Massa-
chusetts held a convention in 1853 to revise their organic law 
despite 6 Cush. He quotes from a number of eminent jur-
ists who took part in it. No question of its unconstitution-
ality was suggested. The author of 14 R. I. does not refer to 
this assemblage although it took place twenty years after 
the opinion in 6 Cush. was written. 
In 1917 another convention was held in Massachusetts. 
Its constitutionality was expressly upheld in Loring vs. 
Young, 239 Mass. 350. 
Mr. Hoar, in his work, holds that our Court erred in citing 
6 Cush. in support of its position. Mr. Atwill, former At-
torney General of Massachusetts, is quoted by Mr. Hoar as 
holding that both the convention and specific amendment 
modes are available to the people as they choose. The pres-
ent attitude of Massachusetts strongly supports the sov-
ereign right of the electors of Rhode Island to have a con-
vention called. 
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Hoar. p. 46. "Modern Interpretations", etc,: 
"It was assumed in the opinion (R.I . ) that the 
opinion applies to the existing constitutional laws of 
the Commonwealth and the rights and powers retained 
from and under them, and did not depend upon the 
natural right of the people in cases of great emergency, 
or upon the obvious failure of their existing Constitu-
tion to accomplish the objects for which it was designed, 
to provide for the management and alteration of their 
fundamental laws. 
"It was contended that there was precedent for this 
opinion (L e„ the Rhode Island one) in an earlier 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. A 
careful study of the opinion of the Massachusetts Court, 
however, shows that its opinion related to another mat-
ter. Citing Holcombe. 'State Government*, p. 95, bot-
tom of p. 47. Hoar: "'The Rhode Island Court, even has 
recognized the right to hold unauthorized conventions 
'ex necessitate,' 
See opinion of Attorney General Atwill of Massa-
chusetts. with reference to conventions in that state: 
'This incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible 
right, which indeed is the essence of a Republi-
can form of government, can not, in my judgment, be 
taken away except by plain and unmistakable language. 
That the people of one generation can deprive the peo-
ple of a succeeding generation of their inalienable right 
to reform, alter, or totally change their form of govern-
ment, except in a restricted manner, when their protec-
tion. safety, prosperity, and happiness require it is re-
pugnant to our theory of government. That the right 
to govern depends upon the consent of the governed. 
It seems to me a much more reasonable, if not a neces-
sary construction of the Constitution to hold that Art, 
IX "Of Amendments" provides only a manner of amend-
ing the Constitution in addition to other methods that 
may be adopted by the people of changing their form of 
government under the fundamental right granted by 
the people of rights, whenever 'their protection, safety, 
prosperity, and happiness require it.* Accordingly. I 
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am of the opinion that the convention will be held un-
der the authority of the Commonwealth." 
(21) By substituting Art. XIII of the Constitution of 
Rhode Island for Art. IX of the Constitution of Massachu-
setts, the opinion of Attorney General Atwill should be con-
trolling on the questions submitted to the Court in this pro-
ceeding. 
As pointed out by him, the electors have a choice of two 
methods. The particular mode to be chosen depends upon 
the extent of the revision proposed e. g. It would be unwise 
to call a convention for amendments Nos. I, II, III, V, VI, 
VIII, IX and X. Our "venerated ancestors" deemed it 
necessary to call a convention to adjust the suffrage problem 
in 1842. Under the charter they could have passed a specific 
law amending it, if they desired to do so. 14 R. I. 653. 
(22) The present far-reaching political problems, insol-
uble except by a convention, furnish proof of the truth of 
the opinion of Mr. Atwill in regard to the right of the people 
to hold it. 
Thomas Jefferson: 
"It is not only the right, but the duty of those now on 
the stage of action, to change the laws and institutions 
of government, keep pace with the progress of knowl-
edge, the light of science, and the amelioration of the 
condition of society. Nothing is to be considered un-
changeable, but the inherent and inalienable rights of 
man." 
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States: 
"It has been said that the people had already sur-
rendered all their power to the state sovereignties and 
had nothing more to give. But, surely the question 
whether they may resume and modify the powers 
granted the government does not remain to be settled 
in this country." 
4 Wheat. 405. 
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James Wilson, a signer of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, a member of the convention of 1787 which framed the 
Constitution of the United States, and afterwards a judge of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, "Lectures on Law," 
Vol. I, p. 17. Works VIII, p. 292. 
(23) These quotations are to be considered with relation 
to Sec. 23 of Art. I : "The enumeration of the foregoing 
rights shall not be construed to impair or deny other rights 
retained by the people." 
The right to revise the Constitution by means of a con-
vention instead of specific amendments is one of "the rights 
retained by the people They exercised it before and since 
the adoption of the Constitution. If it is unalienable, the 
members of the convention were powerless to destroy or im-
pair it. They did not attempt to do so. Whence, then, is 
the authority for anyone but the people in the exercise of 
their sovereign power to abridge it? Mr. Atwill pointed out 
that Art. XIII does not furnish the authority. That is but 
one mode of changing the Constitution. The other is still 
operative. It was overlooked, or ignored, in 14 R. I. The 
opinion of Mr. Atwill, quoted on page 20 of this argument, 
renders further discussion as to the unsoundness of that pro-
nouncement a work of supererogation. 
(24) In concluding the writers analysis of 14 R. I. 649, 
he would call the court's attention to the language of the 
first paragraph on p. 654. beginning with the words, 
"Any new constitution, therefore, which a convention 
would form, would be a new constitution only in name, 
but would be in fact our present constitution amended. 
It is impossible for us to imagine any alteration, con-
sistent with a republican form of government, which can 
not be effected by specific amendment as provided in the 
constitution." 
150 
The mental attitude reflected by this language renders 
pertinent the statement of the Court in Carr vs. American 
Locomotive Co., 31 R. I. 234, p. 242 : 
"This position presupposes in the judicial mind an in-
fallibility in the determination of conflicting issues of 
fact (dealing with the sovereign right of the people) 
which few courts would claim for themselves." 
It presupposes an absolute inerrancy of prophecy not often 
found in judicial proceedings. Ponte vs. Marconi, 27 R. I. 1, 
at 8: 
"No doubt but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die 
with you." 
It cannot make the slightest difference in such a proceeding 
as this whether it was or was not impossible for the Court 
to imagine anything with reference to the right of the people 
to change their Constitution. 
In March 1883 it was impossible for the average person 
to imagine himself sitting in his home listening to a short 
wave broadcast by radio of a musical concert from Berlin, 
London, or South Africa. It was equally beyond the range 
of one's imagination to visualize long distance telephonic 
communication, submarine transportation, transcontinental 
aeroplane trips from New York to San Francisco in less than 
twelve hours. It was impossible for the so-called learned 
men up to the first third of the seventeenth century to im-
agine the mobility of the earth. It was not until Galilei 
proved it that they were willing to think it possible. 
They forced a recantation of his opinion. As he arose 
from his knees, he is supposed to have said, "E pur si mouve." 
"And yet it moves." These are now commonplace facts, in-
dicating that scientific matters have advanced far beyond 
the imagination of those who lived in 1883. Why is it not 
equally axiomatic that, in the field of political science the 
statement of Galilei is pertinent, "And yet it moves"? 
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It is to take advantage of this changed condition in the 
realm of civil government that the people, by an overwhelm-
ing demand, in the recent election requested that they be 
enabled to exercise the unquestionable right to alter their 
Constitution, in convention, despite the advisory opinion in 
14 R. I. 649, which is an exemplification of "parens patriae", 
untenable under our system of government. 
(25) The view expressed "In Re, Constitutional Conven-
tion," 14 R. I., is contrary to all the authorities that have 
discussed the subject. Dodd, "Revision and Amendment of 
State Constitutions" p. 45: 
"As has been said above, the Rhode Island opinion is 
contrary to the uniform practice of the states." 
At bottom of p. 47, that author gives a list of instances 
where there were no provisions for conventions to be found 
in the constitutions of those states. Nevertheless, they were 
held. See pp. 66 and 118. Introductory statement of Hon. 
William P. Sheffield, Sr., in an article written in reply to 
the views of Judge Bradley and Abraham A. Payne; Roger 
Sherman Hoar, pp. 9 and 48; Cooley Cons. Lim. 7th ed., p. 
56; Dodd, p. 120; 
"As already suggested in an earlier chapter, the conven-
tion system has been adopted almost as extensively, and 
although twelve of the State Constitutions now in force 
make no specific provisions for conventions, yet in a 
number of these states conventions have been held, and 
Rhode Island is the only one of them in which the view is 
officially declared against the holding of a convention. It 
may, therefore, be said that New Hampshire is the only 
state in which amendments may not be proposed by the 
Legislature, and Rhode Island is perhaps the only ex-
ception to the rule that conventions may be held for the 
revising of State Constitutions." 
(26) Prof. J. Q. Dealey, former member of the faculty of 
Brown University, "American State Constitutions," makes 
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a vital distinction which is important to bear in mind 
throughout. He points out that "amendments", found in 
Art. XIII, as that term was understood when the Constitu-
tion was adopted in 1843, is entirely dissimilar from "con-
vention" which was the mode used in formulating it. 
The Court, in 14 R. I., at 653 rcognized the distinction 
emphasized by Prof. Dealey: 
"Power in the assembly to call a convention or to initiate 
amendments in some other manner might be implied 'ex 
necessitate'." 
Later in the opinion, however, it seemed to confuse them as 
meaning the same thing: 
"any act of the assembly providing for a convention to 
amend the Constitution is unconstitutional and void." 
(27) "Nihil simile idem." "Nothing similar is the 
same." There is no similarity, and, of course, no sameness, 
between "amendments" and "convention" as those terms are 
understood in constitutional law. The application of the 
rule "expressio unius" in regard to amendments can not rea-
sonably be extended to comprehend conventions unless it is 
not only the same thing but also that it is stated so unequi-
vocally that there can be no misunderstanding about it. Art. 
XIII does not use such language. It is no where to be found 
in the Constitution. It is this confusion of the term "amend-
ments" with "conventions" which has to do with the right of 
the people as distinguished from the Assembly that has given 
rise to the erroneous conclusion held in 14 R. I. 649. 
Prof. Dealey, in his work, "Political Situation in Rhode 
Island," bottom p. 44: 
"By all American precedents the Assembly has the power 
to call a convention or to refer the matter to the voters 
for decision." 
In speaking of the view expressed in 14 R. I., he said: 
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"The opinion is clung to by party leaders merely as a 
subterfuge to escape the revision of the Constitution, 
(p. 45.) Why not then, call a convention consisting of 
small membership, elected from equally popular dis-
tricts, with power unlimited except by national consti-
tution and referring its distinctions directly to the elec-
tors for approval or rejection?" 
(28) Section 1 of the act of the Assembly passed at the 
June session, 1842, which called the convention which 
adopted the present Constitution, provides that the dele-
gates— 
"may frame a new Constitution for this state either in 
whole or in part, with full powers for that purpose 
That same power exists today. 
(29) The centuries old tradition of the sovereign, inde-
feasible right of the people to hold such a convention in 1935 
called by the General Assembly is reflected in the resolution 
passed, May 29, 1790, in ratification of the Federal Constitu-
tion : 
II "That all power is naturally vested in, and conse-
quently derived from the people; that magistrates, 
therefore, are their trustees and changes are at all 
times amenable to them." 
I l l "That the powers of government may be re-assumed 
by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary 
to their happiness." 
It was in an atmosphere developed by and from the recog-
nition of these principles that the convention of 1842 was 
held. 
(30) Attached to this argument is a list of the names of 
the delegates to the convention in 1842. Among them were 
men who later became Chief Justices of this Court:—Job 
Durfee, George A. Brayton—and Associate Justices Potter 
and Shearman, William P. Sheffield, Sr., and others equally 
prominent in the legal, political, and social life of the State. 
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These men were deeply learned in the distinctive Rhode 
Island view of sovereignty being an unalienable right in the 
people. 
No one knew it better than they. As stated by Chief Jus-
tice Bradley, if it was intended to deprive the future gen-
erations of electors of the sovereign right which had been 
exercised by and for themselves and their predecessors un-
questioned for centuries, they would have said so in language 
which was unmistakable to that end. 
The omission to do so on the part of such men is 
a demonstration that they conceded the right to revise the 
Constitution by convention as an almost sacred one which, 
as trustees, they did not undertake to minimize, not to 
speak of prohibiting its free and unrestricted use to those 
who were to come after them. Those men did not pretend 
to be omniscient or infallible. They knew that their work 
was likely to prove imperfect in some respect in the future. 
They also knew it was not like "the laws of the Medes and 
Persians which altereth not," They likewise knew, in the 
words of Pope: 
"Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see, 
Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor shall be." 
They presumed that their successors would be as intelli-
gent and as conscientious as they were in solving the civic 
problems that were bound to arise after they had departed 
from this earth. They left for us the same measure and 
quality of right which they exercised for themselves and as 
trustees for their fellow-citizens. 
(31) No one at all familiar with the history of the State 
can have any doubt as to the tenacity of our people in regard 
to their right to revise the Constitution in convention being 
reserved to them by Art. I, Sec. 1 and 23 of the Constitution. 
This distinctive Rhode Island concept of sovereignty was 
ably and eloquently limned by Mr. Justice Capotosto when, 
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acting as Assistant Attorney General of the State, in the 
case of State of Rhode Island vs. Palmer, before the Supreme 
Court of the United States, he discussed the 18th Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States from the 
Rhode Island viewpoint. 
Burke's Report on the Dorr controversy contains an ex-
haustive citation of authority in support of the view held by 
the writer. 
(32) The authorities quoted by Judge Bradley in his 
article show that, in Rhode Island, the questions submitted 
are political and, therefore, are not to be passed upon by the 
Court. Hoar, pp. 162 and 163, especially at 164, has to say: 
"On the whole it may be said that the Courts have no 
power to interfere with convention proceedings relative 
to framing of the constitution and will probably treat 
the finally adopted changes as a political question, al-
though the courts will prevent the convention from 
usurping the powers of other departments." 
"If it be held that the question raised on the record is 
a political one, that would be decisive against the peti-
tioners." 
Loring vs. Young, 239 Mass. 350. 
(33) At 361 that Court pointed out a weakness in advis-
ory opinions: 
"When called to decide the same matter coming before 
them as a Court, the justices are bound most seduously 
to guard against any influence flowing from their previ-
ous consideration in their advisory capacity." 
In the instant case the personnel of the Court are not con-
fronted with that situation. It comes to them "de novo." 
(34) In the final analysis of the matters set out in this 
argument, there are, at least, two unanswerable reasons 
which lead to an affirmative answer to the questions sub-
mitted in the first subdivision of the request presented by 
Governor Green: 
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The obsolescence of Art, XIII of the Constitution, 
entitled, "Of Amendments". It has been legally impossible, 
since November 1900, when the day of election was changed 
from "in April" to "the Tuesday after the first Monday of 
November to submit proposals of amendment. There was 
no substitute provided for the submission to the electors "in 
April", when the Constitution was amended changing the 
day of election, as called for in Art. XIII "Of Amendments", 
to "the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. 
So that, for more than 34 years, there has been no provision 
for submission of amendments by the General Assembly. 
This is true, notwithstanding the fact that Art. XII, XIII, 
XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, and X X "Of 
Amendments" appear to have been adopted on dates subse-
quent to the adoption of Art. XI, Sec. 2, which changed the 
day of town and ward meetings from April to November. 
As already pointed out, all sections of the Constitution in-
consistent with Sec. 2 of Art. XI were annulled by Sec. 12 
of that article. Art. XIII is clearly inconsistent. 
Assuming, but not conceding, the next preceding position 
to be untenable, the case of "In Re, Constitutional Conven-
tion," 14 R. I. 649, which is but an advisory opinion, is con-
trary to the unanimous line of authority. 
(35) The Court should do with that case as it did in 
Allen vs. Danielson, 15 R, I. 480 when it overruled Knowles 
vs. Petitioner, 13 R. I. 90; i. e., bring the law of this jurisdic-
tion into harmony with what other jurisdictions hold it to 
be, p. 483: 
"And that by doing so we shall not only establish the 
correct rule, but also which is no inconsiderable gain, 




(36) The conclusion at which the Court is asked to ar-
rive, in the light of the authorities before it, is stated in 
Horton vs. City of Newport, 27 R. I. 283, at 294: 
"It is needless to say, in view of all these matters, that 
the Court in this instance does not find that the act in 
question is in violation of Art. IV, Sec. 10, of the Con-
stitution; but, on the contrary finds that this exercise 
of legislative power is well within the provisions of the 
Constitution." 
Nunnemacher vs. State, 129 Wis. 190: 
"It should be cause for much gratification to all who ap-
preciate the principles of constitutional liberty, now so 
signally vindicated, that rising above the influence of 
mere precedent, the court has the courage to cut loose 
from a judicial error that has been almost universally 
proclaimed by the courts of this country for many years 
again demonstrating that 
" 'Truth crushed to earth shall rise again; 
The eternal years of God are hers; 
But Error, wounded, writhes with pain, 
And dies among his worshipers.' " 
The writer thanks the Court for the privilege of submit-
ting his views on what is recognized as a matter of lasting 
importance to the people of this State. He further requests 
the Court by its opinion to give renewed expression to the 
Rhode Island idea of civil government stated by Roger 
Williams, nearly three centuries ago: 
"Whereas they say, that the Civill Power may erect and 
establish what forms of civill Government may seem in 
Wisdome most meet, I acknowledge the Proposition to 
be most true. * * * But from this Grant I infer, (as be-
fore hath been touched) that the Sovereign, original, 
and foundation of Civill power lies in the People, (whom 
they must needs mean by the civill power distinct from 
the Government set up.) And if so, that a People may 
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erect and establish what forms of Government seemes to 
them most meete for their civill condition. It is evident 
that such Governments as are by them erected and es-
tablished, have no more power, nor for no longer time, 
than the civill power or people consenting and agreeing 
shall betrust them with. This is cleere not only in Rea-
son, but in the experience of all commonweales, where 
the people are not deprived of their naturall freedom by 
the power of the tyrants." 
Dr. Charles Carroll, "Three Centuries of Democracy": 
"In this also lies the promise for the future of Rhode Is-
land. Rhode Island in the twentieth century is still a 
state in which widely different cultures meet and mingle 
peaceably and harmoniously because Rhode Island is 
still engaged in the lively experiment. No good Rhode 
Islander may venture to think that in the century we 
have reached more than the ever present, and that there 
is no future. The future is plainly indicated by the past. 
Rhode Island will go forward, as always through the 
past three centuries, still leading the nation and the 
world to new visions of democracy made real in the ex-
emplification of the Rhode Island principles." 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS F . COONEY. 
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Personnel of Convention Which Adopted the Constitution 
Operative "The First Tuesday of May in the Year 
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty Three." 
Newport: 
Henry Y. Cranston 
Richard K. Randolph 
Edward W. Lawton 
William Ennis 
Providence: 










John J. Wood 
William Rhodes 
William Sprague 
George A. Brayton 
Westerly: 
George D. Cross 
Daniel Babcock 
New Shoreham: 
William P. Sheffield 
Simon R. Sands 
North Kingstown: 
Sylvester G. Shearman 
Asa B. Waite 
South Kingstown: 
Wilkins Updike 
William A. Robinson 
Elisha R. Potter 
East Greenwich: 
James Reynolds 
Hollis K. Jenks 
Jamestown: 
Robert H. Watson 
George Knowles 
Smithfield: 
Samuel B. Harris 
Charles Moies 
Nathaniel B. Sprague 






Gideon L. Spencer 
Andrew Almy 
Henry B. Lyman 
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John H. Wells 
Johnston: 
James F. Simmons 
Olney Hendrick 
Foster: 
William G. Stone 
Horace Howard 
Burrillville: 
Dana Wheelock 
Willard Esten 
